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General Purpose Technologies: engines of change?
Miguel Barroso Morin
This dissertation examines the relevance of technology in explaining structural and
cyclical changes in the labor and product markets. The first chapter focuses on computers
and the labor market, the second chapter on electricity and the labor market, and the third
chapter focuses on computers and the goods market.
The three chapters rely on a General Purpose Technology and on the distinction between
routine and nonroutine jobs. A General Purpose Technology has three characteristics: it
has pervasive use in all industries, it improves over time, and it is able to foster other
innovations. This dissertation considers the technology of computers in the second half
of the 20th century and electricity in the first half. It defines “pervasive use” as the
technology’s ability to substitute for some types of jobs—called routine jobs—more than
others. Routine jobs consist of repetitive tasks, follow an explicit set of rules, and can
easily be automated by the technology. Nonroutine jobs are the remaining jobs, which
cannot be easily replaced by the technology. For computers, examples of routine jobs
are clerks and secretaries, since their work can be automated with information processing
software, whereas examples of nonroutine jobs are managers and health aides, since their
work requires creativity or personal interactions. For electricity, examples of routine jobs
are laborers on the factory floor, since their work can be automated by the conveyor belt,
whereas examples of nonroutine jobs are foremen and engineers, since their work requires
attention or detailed calculations. The distinction between routine and nonroutine jobs
depends on the technology: accountants can be nonroutine relative to electricity and routine
relative to computers.
The first chapter examines computers as a theoretical explanation for changes in the US
labor market in recent decades. When computers become cheap and competitive compared
to workers, they di↵use more rapidly and become more important in the conventional mech-
anism of capital-labor substitution. The model can account for recent structural changes
with this trend of automation: employment has shifted away from routine occupations and
the labor share of income has declined. The model also predicts that recessions accelerate
the decline in routine occupations—firms prefer to destroy routine jobs during a downturn,
when the opportunity cost of restructuring is low. This acceleration can account for recent
cyclical changes of the labor market: routine job losses are concentrated in recessions and
the ensuing recoveries are jobless.
The second chapter examines the labor market and electricity in the first half of the 20th
century. The 1920s and 1930s witnessed large changes in the US labor market, with a shift
away from dexterity-intensive occupations, a productivity speedup, and low job creation.
The second chapter asks whether the model of the first chapter, which explained labor
market changes since the 1980s with the adoption of computers, can also explain labor
market changes in the 1930s with the adoption of electricity. It supports the model’s main
assumption by empirically testing the model’s prediction for the labor share of income.
The identification strategy uses a state’s initial loading on the technology to generate
electricity—hydroelectric power or coal power—as an instrument for changes in the price
of electricity. It also uses a newly digitized dataset for the concrete industry from 1929 to
1935 to provide plant-level measures of the labor share of income. Technical progress in
electric utilities caused a decrease in the labor share of income of the downstream industry
of concrete. This result supports the mechanism in the model, which can in turn explain
other features of the 1920s and 1930s: structural changes in employment, a productivity
speedup, and a weak recovery of employment after the Great Depression.
The third chapter examines the behavior of consumption in the second half of the 20th
century. The recoveries from the last three recessions in the United States were not only
jobless, they were also slow. The growth rate of output and consumption after the trough of
the business cycle is twice as small for the last three recessions compared to previous ones.
This chapter asks whether the structural decline in employment of routine occupations
can also account for recent slow recoveries in consumption. It assumes that workers in
nonroutine occupations are optimizing agents who can smooth consumption by saving,
whereas workers in routine occupations are hand-to-mouth agents who consume all of their
income. Before the 1980s, workers in routine occupations can easily find another routine
job right after the recession, so consumption decreases in the recession and “bounces back”
in the recovery. After the 1980s, workers in routine occupations need to go through a
period of retraining in order to find a new job, so the recovery of consumption is delayed
until they finish retraining. In a simulation of the model, the recovery of consumption
is twice smaller after the 1980s than before, which suggests that this mechanism may be
quantitatively important in explaining recent slow recoveries.
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Computer adoption and the changing
labor market
1.1 Introduction
The US labor market has undergone three structural changes since the 1980s. First, em-
ployment has shifted away from routine occupations since 1990. Routine occupations are
middle-skill, repetitive jobs that follow explicit rules and are easily automated, such as
clerks, accountants, and auditors. Nonroutine occupations are jobs intensive in creativity
and personal interactions at both ends of the skill distribution: high-skill cognitive jobs,
such as managers and engineers, and low-skill manual jobs, such as janitors and health
aides.1 Second, the growth rate of labor productivity increased from 1.6% before 1995 to
2.5% after 1995.2 Third, the labor share of income declined by 7.5% between 1981 and
1See Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006); Goos and Manning (2007); Goldin and Katz (2007); Autor and
Dorn (2009) and Autor (2010).
2See Jones (2011).
1
2007.3 Several authors suggested computers,4 whose share of fixed investment accelerated
in the 1980s (see Appendix A.4), as a plausible explanation for these changes.
The US labor market has also undergone two cyclical changes since the 1980s: the
secular decline in routine jobs is concentrated in recessions,5 and the ensuing recoveries
have been jobless, i.e. employment recovers much slower than output (see Figure 1.1).6
This chapter provides a theoretical contribution with a simple model of capital-labor
substitution that reconciles the five facts. This chapter bridges the gap between growth and
business cycles, between the literature on long-term technology adoption and the literature
on the “cleansing e↵ects” of recessions.7
The model has two main assumptions relevant for the medium-term behavior of the
economy: computer capital substitutes routine jobs more than nonroutine jobs and the
price of computer capital decreases with time. Firms producing output with either routine
jobs or computer capital adjust their input mix, substituting away from the expensive
input of labor and into the cheaper input of capital. The lower demand for routine jobs
implies a shift away from these occupations—an endogenous routinization of production.
Employment reallocates into nonroutine jobs with high marginal productivity and away
from routine jobs with low marginal productivity, so the growth rate of labor productivity
increases by a compositional e↵ect—an endogenous productivity speedup. Capital-labor
substitution raises payments to capital and reduces those to labor—an endogenous fall in
the labor share of income.
3See Blanchard, Nordhaus and Phelps (1997), and Rodriguez and Jayadev (2013).
4See Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003); Oliner, Sichel and Stiroh (2007); Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1994);
Basu, Fernald and Shapiro (2001); Jorgenson (2001); Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) and Saint-Paul
and Bentolila (2003).
5Jaimovich and Siu (2012) find that 95% of the secular decline in routine jobs occurs in recessions.
6See Gordon (1993); Andolfatto and MacDonald (2004); and Schreft, Singh and Hodgson (2005).
7See Helpman and Trajtenberg (1994); Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995); Caballero and Hammour
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Average of first 7 recoveries: 1.8%. Average of last 3 recoveries: -0.0%.
Figure 1.1: Payroll employment is slower to recover after the last three recessions, for a
given recovery of output of 5%.













The model also clarifies why the price of computers has been falling since 1950 but
starts a↵ecting the labor market in the 1980s. When computers are too expensive, as in
the 1950s, firms use routine jobs instead. Firms always adjust to the change in the price
of computers, but the adjustment is small when computers are expensive. Conversely,
when computers are cheap, firms have already replaced routine jobs and a further decrease
in the price of computers is irrelevant for capital-labor substitution. The substitution of
technology capital for labor in routine jobs is quantitatively important when the price of
the technology is in a specific range.
The model also clarifies that the substitutability between computer capital and routine
jobs needs to be high enough in order to match the structural changes. For example, with a
Cobb-Douglas production function, computer capital is equally substitutable to all factors
and the routine share of employment is constant. Employment does not reallocate away
3
from routine and into nonroutine, so the growth rate of labor productivity is also constant.
The Cobb-Douglas case implies constant factor shares, so the labor share of income is also
constant.
To examine the cyclical behavior of the model, the third and last assumption is a
hiring cost. In the technological upgrading from routine jobs to computer capital, firms
know that they will fire workers in routine occupations in the medium-term. As computers
complement nonroutine jobs, firms also know that they will hire more workers in nonroutine
occupations. In a recession, forward-looking firms consider how to adjust the two types of
jobs. If firms fire workers in nonroutine occupations, they will need to hire them back and
pay a hiring cost. So firms avoid destroying nonroutine jobs and hoard them during the
recession. In contrast, firing workers in routine occupations does not entail future hiring
costs since their medium-term trend is declining. The burden of adjustment falls on routine
occupations, whose job losses become concentrated in recessions.
Finally, the model can also account for jobless recoveries. As firms avoid firing workers
in nonroutine jobs during recessions, they also refrain from hiring them back temporarily,
i.e. they dishoard nonroutine jobs during the recovery. Firms also refrain from hiring
workers in routine jobs because of their secular decline. Employment is stagnant even as
output recovers, leading to a jobless recovery. When computers are expensive earlier in
time, the trend of routine jobs is constant and employment recovers to the pre-crisis level,
leading to a “jobful” recovery. A calibration of the model to fit the path of US GDP
matches both the structural and the cyclical changes of the US labor market.
Related literature. This chapter relates to two strands of the literature: short-term
adjustments of the labor market and General Purpose Technologies. On the short-term
adjustments of the labor market, the closest paper is Jaimovich and Siu (2012), which
also uses a distinction between routine and nonroutine jobs to explain the concentration of
routine job losses in recessions and jobless recoveries. They assume that the productivity
4
of nonroutine jobs increases exogenously faster than the productivity of routine jobs, so
workers in routine jobs have an incentive to reallocate into nonroutine jobs. Because of a
period of retraining from routine to nonroutine occupations, workers prefer to reallocate
when the opportunity cost is low, i.e. during recessions if wages are procyclical. Compared
to the labor supply mechanism of Jaimovich and Siu, the model in this chapter uses a labor
demand mechanism with hiring costs for firms. Furthermore, the model in this chapter
is more robust to the possibility of rigid wages. The cyclical mechanism in Jaimovich
and Siu requires wages to fall in recessions, which is counterfactual. This chapter has
a baseline model where wages also fall in recessions but it is easy to extend the model
to include nominal rigidities. This extension produces similar results: with rigid wages
and hiring costs, firms still hoard expanding nonroutine jobs in the recession and shift
the burden of adjustment on routine jobs (see Appendix A.5). A second explanation for
recent cyclical changes of the labor market is Berger (2012), who argues that the recent
decrease in unionization allows firms to fire unproductive workers more easily during the
last three recessions. Similar to this chapter, Berger matches the emergence of longer jobless
recoveries after the 1980s by distinguishing between two types of workers. A contribution of
the model in this chapter is the emergence of jobless recoveries with a continuous mechanism
rather than a structural break. Another contribution is to suggest jobless recoveries as a
recurrent issue in economic history, linked to the decrease in the cost of an essential input,
such as electricity in the 1930s.
Second, the literature on General Purpose Technologies defined them with three char-
acteristics: pervasive use in industry, decreasing cost for a given quality, and capacity to
foster other innovations (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2005, page 1185). If the General Pur-
pose Technology is more substitutable to unskilled labor than to skilled labor, its adoption
would increase the skill premium (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2005, page 1205). This chapter
departs from the literature by studying the e↵ects of the General Purpose Technology on
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the labor share of income rather than on inequality.
1.2 A model of growth and business cycles
This section introduces a model to study the labor market consequences of computer adop-
tion. The model uses computers for clarity but it can also apply to other General Purpose
Technologies, such as electricity in the second chapter. Time is indexed as t = 1, 2, . . . . All
agents have perfect foresight.
1.2.1 The household
A representative household consumes output, supplies labor, invests in capital, and rents
















where ✓ is the discount factor, Xt is a labor supply shifter, and the remaining notation is
standard.8 The household has preferences as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu↵man (1988)
with no income e↵ects on labor supply.9 The labor supply shifter Xt has trend growth to
ensure a balanced growth path with a constant trend of employment. It can also have a
cycle to represent a reduced-form labor wedge.10
Capital is either computer capital KC,t or non-computer capital KNC,t. The household
8Specifically, C
t
is consumption, " is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and L
t
is labor supply.
9See Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) who find small income e↵ects
on labor supply in the short-term.
10See Hall (1997, page 226) for a similar example of using a preference shifter as a labor wedge. See also
Balleer (2012) for the importance of the labor wedge for explaining labor market dynamics.
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accumulates capital with a perpetual inventory formula for each type of capital:
KC,t+1 = (1    C)KC,t + IC,t, (1.2.2)
KNC,t+1 = (1    NC)KNC,t + INC,t. (1.2.3)
The household has access to a technology that transforms output into investment: one
unit of output becomes one unit of non-computer investment INC,t and one unit of output
becomes ebt units of computer investment IC,t. Alternatively, the cost of non-computer
investment is 1 and the cost of computer investment is e bt .
Considering consumption as the numeraire, the household has a budget constraint that
balances consumption and investment with labor income and capital income:
Ct + INC,t + exp ( bt) IC,t = wtLt + rNC,tKNC,t + rC,tKC,t + profitst, (1.2.4)
where wt is the wage, rJ,t are the rental rates of capital (J = I,N), and profitst are the
firm’s profits in period t, which the household takes as given.
The first crucial assumption is the medium-term increase in the productivity bt:
Assumption 1. The logarithm bt of the productivity of the computer-producing technology
increases exogenously with time:
bt % in t.
Alternatively, the cost of computers e bt decreases with time. Scholars disagree on the
exact rate of decrease in the cost of computers,11 but agree that it was high. Table 1.1
shows four estimates of the rate of decrease in the cost of computers, ranging from 8 percent
to 27 percent. Figure 1.2, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), illustrates this
rapid decrease: between 1960 and 2010, the cost of computers declined ten-thousand-fold.
11See Nordhaus (2007, Table 10, page 153) for a compilation of studies and methods.
7
Study Time span Rate of decrease
Sichel (1997, page 122) 1987-1993 8 %
Bureau of Economic Analysis 1957-2010 18 %
Nordhaus (2007, page 142) 1850-2006 19 %
Berndt and Rappaport (2001, page 271) 1976-1999 27 %
Table 1.1: The cost of computing power decreased significantly over the second half of the
20th century.
1.2.2 Technology
The production function uses four inputs, two types of capital, computer capital KC,t and
non-computer capital KNC,t, and two types of labor, labor in routine jobs LR,t and labor
in nonroutine jobs LNR,t. The production function is:



















where At is Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and represents fluctuations driven by tech-
nology. The production function has constant returns to scale, with ↵ +   +   = 1. This
production function has Cobb-Douglas aggregation of three factors: non-computer capital
KNC,t, labor in nonroutine jobs LNR,t, and a third factorMt, which is a Constant-Elasticity-
of-Substitution aggregation between computer capital KC,t and labor in routine jobs LR,t.
Krusell et al. (2000) use this production function to explain the increase in income
inequality with capital-skill complementarity, whereby an increase in capital investment
contributes to increasing the skill premium by increasing the marginal product of skilled
labor faster than that of unskilled labor. Autor and Dorn (2009, page 11) also use this
function to explain the recent disappearance of middle-skill, routine occupations: as firms
invest more in computer capital, they increase employment of middle-skill routine jobs
8
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Figure 1.2: The cost of computers has an exponential decrease since 1960.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Price Indexes for Private Fixed Investment in Equipment by Type
(Table 5.5.4U), line “Computers and peripheral equipment.”
slower than low-skill or high-skill nonroutine jobs.
The second crucial assumption is the gross substitutability of computer capital and
labor in routine jobs:
Assumption 2. The elasticity of substitution between computer capital and labor in routine
jobs is at least greater than 1:
    1.
Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) find that computer investment is correlated with a
decrease in routine jobs and an increase in nonroutine jobs. The case   > 1 captures
that di↵erence: the elasticity of substitution between routine jobs and computers is greater
than the elasticity of substitution between nonroutine jobs and the Constant-Elasticity-
of-Substitution aggregate of computers and routine jobs.12 Intuitively, a computer can
12This assumption is both a relative statement, with computers being more substitutable to routine jobs
than to nonroutine jobs, and an absolute statement, with the elasticity of substitution between routine
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more easily replace automated occupations, such as bank tellers or cashiers, than nonrou-
tine occupations, such as managers and engineers. The possibility of   = 1 is kept as a
benchmark.
As will become clear in the next section, that computer capital has a decreasing price and
is labor-saving implies that computers have two features of General Purpose Technologies:
they improve over time and are pervasively used in industry.
1.2.3 The firm
A representative firm demands labor and capital and produces output. It operates under
perfect competition and has profits
profitst = Yt   wt (LNR,t + LR,t)   rNC,tKNC,t   rC,tKC,t
  cNR (LNR,t+1   LNR,t)+   cR (LR,t+1   LR,t)+ , (1.2.6)
where cJ , J = NR,R is the unit cost of hiring workers in nonroutine or routine jobs and
x+ = max (x, 0) is the positive operator. Linear adjustment costs to labor are common in
the literature (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1994) as opposed to quadratic adjustment costs for
capital (Caballero and Hammour, 1994). The firm reverts profits to the household and uses
the household’s discount factor weighted by marginal utility from consumption to compute
the present discounted value of profits (see Appendix A.1).
The third crucial assumption bears on the adjustment cost:
Assumption 3. The costs of hiring are non-negative:
cNR   0, cR   0.
jobs and computers being greater than 1.
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Hiring costs capture the firm-specific value of a match, such as a training cost paid by
the firm for a new worker. This assumption follows from the extensive literature docu-
menting positive hiring costs: Blatter, Muehlemann and Schenker (2012) estimate hiring
costs around one quarter of wages using a dataset of Swiss firms, which Del Boca and Rota
(1998) confirm using a survey of Italian firms. Hamermesh (1993) reports similar values
for the United States: in 1980, the average employer spent 42 hours and two quarters of
wages recruiting and training a new hire.13
1.2.4 Equilibrium
The clearing of the labor market requires that labor supply equal labor demand:
Lt = LNR,t + LR,t. (1.2.7)
This condition, in combination with the utility function, implies that the household is
indi↵erent between the two types of jobs. Labor supply is perfectly substitutable between
routine and nonroutine occupations and the di↵erence is due to labor demand.14 This un-
realistic assumption distinguishes this model from Jaimovich and Siu, where the di↵erence
between routine and nonroutine is entirely due to labor supply. This chapter assesses the
contribution of labor demand alone in explaining the structural and cyclical changes of the
US labor market.15
13Assumption 3 implies that hiring costs are larger than firing costs, which is consistent with Hamermesh:
“The [1965] study found separation costs to be much smaller, roughly $1,780.” For simplicity, the model
assumes that firing costs are zero.
14The clearing of the labor market implies that the wage is endogenous in the model and equates demand
and supply.
15With costly reallocation between the two types of labor, the wage for routine jobs is lower than that
for nonroutine jobs and workers in routine occupations remain competitive for a longer period of time,
which would attenuate the medium-term e↵ects of the model. In contrast, this costly reallocation would
strengthen the short-term e↵ects of the model by a mechanism similar to Jaimovich and Siu: the wage is
the opportunity cost of reallocation and workers prefer to switch jobs during a recession.
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The clearing of the product market follows from the budget constraint, the definition of
the firm’s profits, and the clearing of the labor market. The clearing of the capital market
is implicit in the use of a single symbol for capital supply and capital demand.
An equilibrium of this economy is a set of quantities (consumption Ct, investments IC,t
and INC,t, capital stocks KC,t and KNC,t, employment quantities Lt, LNR,t and LR,t, and
output Yt) and prices (rental rates rC,t and rNC,t, and wages wt), conditional on exogenous
variables (TFP At, the productivity bt of the computer-producing technology, and the labor
supply shifter Xt), such that the household maximizes utility (1.2.1) subject to the capital
accumulation constraints (1.2.2-1.2.3) and the budget constraint (1.2.4); the firm maximizes
the present discounted value of profits (1.2.6) subject to the production function (1.2.5);
and all markets clear. This model nests the Ramsey growth model, which corresponds to a
two-factor production function (  = 0), no adjustment costs (cNR = cR = 0), and constant
labor supply.
The full characterization of the model is in Appendix A.1. An equilibrium of this model
exists as long as the labor supply of the household is bounded above (see Appendix A.1
for the proof using the contraction mapping theorem). This assumption is used only in the
theoretical setting and never binds numerically.
Lemma 4. If the labor supply of the household is bounded above, Lt  L̄, an equilibrium
exists and it is unique.
1.2.5 Balanced growth path
The model has an asymptotic balanced growth path, consistent with the “Kaldor facts”
of a constant interest rate and a constant capital-output ratio (Kaldor, 1961). The fol-
lowing lemma characterizes the behavior of the asymptotic balanced growth path, where
employment is constant and all other quantities, aside from employment, grow at the same
rate.
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Lemma 5. Consider the limiting economy, where TFP grows at rate gA > 0, bt tends to
b̄, the marginal utility from consumption declines at rate gµ, the capital stocks grow at rate
gKNC and gKC , and the labor supply shifter grows at rate gX = gA/ . Then employment is
constant and consumption, output, and all quantities other than employment grow at rate
gA/ .
This model is analytically intractable and has no closed-form solution. The next section
examines a simplified version of the model that has a closed-form solution to clarify the
conditions to match the structural changes of the labor market. Section 1.4 uses the general
version of the model to examine the cyclical changes.
1.3 Medium-term trends
The general model combines growth and business cycles to understand the interaction
between the trend of routinization and the recession. As a first step in understanding the
model, this section uses a simplified version to clarify under which conditions capital-labor
substitution leads to the routinization of production, to a productivity speed-up, and to a
decline in the labor share of income.
1.3.1 Simplifications
Two simplifications render the model analytically tractable. First, hiring costs are zero,
with cNR = cR = 0, so the firm is free to adjust labor. Second, capital accumulates




The firm has no frictions and makes zero profits in all periods. Since capital equals
investment, the household’s budget constraint in equation (1.2.4) is
Ct + (1   rNC,t)KNC,t + (exp ( bt)   rC,t)KC,t  wtLt.
In equilibrium, the household sells capital to the firm at marginal cost, with rNC,t = 1
and rC,t = exp ( bt), and the budget constraint becomes
Ct = wtLt.
The household cannot smooth consumption and the intertemporal utility maximization
is equivalent to a set of independent maximization programs, one for every period. The
household behaves as if it were infinitely impatient, with ✓ ! 0, or as if it lived for one
period and a new household made decisions in the next period.
1.3.2 Endogenous structural changes
This subsection describes how Assumptions 1 and 2, with the restriction   > 1, match the
three structural changes of the labor market. In contrast, the Cobb-Douglas case   = 1
cannot match those changes. This subsection considers constant TFP, with At = A. The
time-varying exogenous variables are the labor supply shifter Xt and the productivity bt of
the computer-producing technology.
Full depreciation of capital pins down the rental rates of capital as the prices of invest-
ment. The missing price in the economy is the wage, which follows from the factor price
frontier in the next lemma. (See Appendix A.3 for all proofs in this subsection.)
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The left-hand side of the factor price frontier is the marginal benefit of selling one more
unit of output, whose price is normalized to 1. The right-hand side is the marginal cost: the
inverse of Total Factor Productivity multiplied by the marginal price of each Cobb-Douglas
factor divided by its share and raised to that share. The marginal price of non-computer
investment is 1, the marginal price of nonroutine jobs is the wage wt, and the marginal
price of the third factor is a Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution aggregation between the
rental rate of computer capital and the wage.
The aggregation between the rental rate of computers and the wage is the key to the
model’s ability to match the structural changes. To understand the economic intuition
for this mechanism, consider the two limits of expensive and cheap computers. When
computers are expensive, the term r1  C,t vanishes from the equation and the factor price
frontier is close to that of a labor-intensive production function with three Cobb-Douglas











When computers are cheap, the term r1  C,t gains importance, the term w
1  
t vanishes
from the equation, and the factor price frontier is close to that of a capital-intensive pro-
duction function with three Cobb-Douglas factors of in non-computer capital, labor in











The transition from expensive to cheap computers is a phase of technological upgrading
from a labor-intensive to a capital-intensive production function. The transition phase
matches the three structural changes of the US labor market. Employment shifts away
from routine jobs, which have a share of   in the labor-intensive production function and
a share of 0 in the capital-intensive production function. Computers do not contribute
to output and labor productivity in the labor-intensive production function but they do
contribute in the capital-intensive production function, so labor productivity speeds up.
The labor share of income decreases from   +   in the labor-intensive production function
to   in the capital-intensive production function.
Even though computers are steadily becoming cheaper, they do not a↵ect the economy
in the region of the labor-intensive production function. The price of computers has been
decreasing since 1950, but at the time they were so expensive that firms relied on routine
jobs instead. It is in the 1980s that computers become competitive compared to routine
jobs and start a↵ecting the economy. The firm always adjusts to the change in the price of
computers but the adjustment is small when the cost of computers is large.
The rest of this section supports this economic intuition. It shows analytically that
  > 1 and an increase in bt are su cient for the model to match the structural changes of
the US labor market. It also shows that, when the price of computers is su ciently high,
a decrease in the price of computers has little e↵ect on the economy.
The next proposition shows that a decrease in the cost of computers causes a decrease
in the routine share of employment. An increase in productivity bt makes computer capital
cheaper and impacts routine jobs more than nonroutine jobs. Given the single labor market,
the household reallocates away from routine jobs and into nonroutine jobs. This prediction
is consistent with the routinization hypothesis of Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), who
find that the use of computers decreases demand for routine jobs.
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Moreover, the productivity bt of the computer-producing sector impacts the logarithm of
















The next proposition shows that progress in the computer-producing technology causes
a productivity speedup in the wider economy.














For   2 (1, 2], the e↵ect of bt on labor productivity is monotonic, i.e. labor productivity




For   > 2, the e↵ect of bt on labor productivity has an inflexion point:
@2⇡t
@b2t
> 0 i↵ bt < b
⇤.
The transition between the two asymptotes for labor productivity can be monotonic,
for    2, or non-monotonic, for   > 2. To understand the inflexion point, consider
the extreme case of   = +1. Then computers are infinitely substitutable with routine
occupations and the cost of computers has a threshold at rC,t = wt, when the firm fires all
routine occupations and invests in computer capital. The technological upgrading phase
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is instantaneous: the growth rate of labor productivity is zero before the threshold (since
TFP is constant), infinite at the threshold, and finite after the threshold. For finite  , the
e↵ects of bt on labor productivity are continuous with no threshold. When computers and
routine occupations are substitutable enough, i.e. for   > 2, the behavior of productivity
also has an inflexion point, with a rapid replacement of workers with computers for bt  b⇤.
For moderate substitution between computers and computers, for 1 <    2, the behavior
of productivity between the two asymptotes is smooth and monotonic. The threshold
of   = 2 is similar to Acemoglu (2009, page 510), who finds a di↵erent behavior for an
economy with directed technical change depending on whether the elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled labor is above or below 2.
Another interpretation of log-convex labor productivity is that the impact of techno-
logical progress of the computer-producing sector on the wider economy is increasing with
time. The impact factor is the ratio of ⇡̇t/ḃt, which equals ḃt @2⇡t/@b2t and is increasing
with time for   2 (1, 2].
The next proposition shows that a decrease in the price of computers causes a decrease
in the labor share of income.
Proposition 9. For   > 1, the labor share of income decreases from   +   to  , linked to
the relative price of computer capital:
wtLt
Yt

















To understand the relevance of the assumption of substitutability between computers
and routine occupations with   > 1, consider the limit of   ! 1. The next corollary shows
the absence of di↵erential e↵ects from the price of computers: productivity growth, the
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labor share of income, and the routine share of employment are constant. At the limit
  ! 1, the production function tends to a four-factor Cobb-Douglas aggregation of non-
computer capital, labor in nonroutine occupations, computer capital, and labor in routine
occupations. Computer capital is equally substitutable to all factors and the routine share
of employment is constant. Employment does not reallocate away from routine and into
nonroutine, so the growth rate of labor productivity is also constant. The Cobb-Douglas
case implies constant factor shares, so the labor share of income is also constant.
Corollary 10. If   ! 1, the e↵ect of computers on labor productivity, the labor share of
















Therefore the two assumptions of   > 1 and an increase in bt are required to match the
three structural changes of the US labor market since the 1980s.
1.3.3 Illustration
To illustrate the mechanism numerically, this subsection calibrates the crucial parameters,
with the remaining parameters calibrated in the full model in Section 1.4. The two impor-
tant parameters are the path of bt and the elasticity of substitution  . With an exponential
decrease in the cost of computers and   > 1, the model matches the structural changes.
The calibration uses a cost of computers that decreases at rate   = 18% per year, the
estimate from the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the middle range of Table 1.1.
The value of   relates to a substantial literature on the estimation of the elasticity of
substitution between aggregate capital and aggregate labor. Using cross-country variation
in the price of investment, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) estimate the elasticity of
substitution at 1.25. Accounting for technological change that may be biased toward some
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factors, Antràs (2004) estimates elasticities of substitution that are not statistically di↵erent
from 1. Unlike the previous literature that mostly focused on the elasticity of substitution
between aggregate capital and aggregate labor, Krusell et al. (2000) estimate the elasticity
of substitution between unskilled labor and equipment. Using time-series data for the
United States, they find an elasticity of substitution of 1.67. Given that this estimate is
closest in spirit to the elasticity of substitution between computer capital and routine jobs,
this chapter uses   = 1.67. Further support for this value comes from the calibration of the
general case of the model in the next section, which predicts a decline in the labor share
of income that is similar to that in the data (see Figure A.3 in the Appendix).
Figure 1.3 shows the behavior of the economy in the medium-term with fictional dates.
Total Factor Productivity is constant, with At = A. The labor supply shifter Xt grows
and exactly o↵sets the increase in the wage so the economy has constant employment, as
in the balanced growth path of Lemma 5. Early in time, the productivity of the computer-
producing technology is low and it has a minimal e↵ect on routine jobs, labor productivity,
and the labor share. Intuitively, computers are too expensive and the firm relies on routine
jobs instead. The labor-intensive phase lasts roughly until the 1980s in this example and
is characterized by near zero share of computer capital in total capital, a constant routine
share of employment, a constant growth rate of labor productivity, and a constant labor
share of income.
As the cost of computers decreases, they become a more attractive investment and the
firm starts replacing routine occupations with computers. Labor reallocates away from
routine jobs LR and into nonroutine jobs LNR, away from jobs that are easily replaced by
computers and into jobs that are more di cult to replace with computers. The marginal
product of nonroutine jobs is higher than the marginal product of routine jobs, so labor
productivity increases by a compositional e↵ect. The firm’s expenses shift away from
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Figure 1.3: The special case of the model matches the medium-term changes: a linear
increase in the productivity of the computer-producing sector causes a decline in the routine
share of employment, a speedup in labor productivity, and a fall in the labor share of income.
is in a technological upgrading phase, characterized by an increasing stock of computer
capital. As mentioned earlier, the transition between the two phases is continuous and
has no threshold e↵ects: the firm always adjusts its input mix, but the adjustment is
quantitatively small when the cost of computers is large.
1.3.4 From medium-term to short-term
This subsection clarifies the link between the productivity speedup in the medium-term
and jobless recoveries in the short-term both analytically and numerically. Note first that
labor productivity depends on the wage and on the cost of computers (see Proposition
9), and the wage depends on the cost of computers and TFP. So labor productivity is
independent of the labor supply shifter Xt and has only has a trend, due to the increase
in the productivity of the computer-producing technology. The next proposition links the
medium-term productivity speedup to jobless recoveries.
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Proposition 11. Suppose that Total Factor Productivity is constant (At = A), that the
trend component of the labor supply shifter Xt o↵sets the growth in wages, and that the
cyclical component of Xt is periodic, with a single trough in each cycle. Define the length of
the jobless recovery as the di↵erence between the trough of output and the trough of labor.
If the length of the jobless recovery is small compared to the period of the business cycle, the
theoretical first-order e↵ect of a productivity speedup is to cause longer jobless recoveries.
Productivity growth is the di↵erence between output growth and employment growth.
The faster the growth rate of labor productivity, the longer output can increase with labor
simultaneously decreasing—a jobless recovery. A speedup in labor productivity between the
labor-intensive phase and the technological upgrading phase implies that jobless recoveries
last longer since the 1980s. This result depends on the two assumptions of an increase in
bt and   > 1. In the Cobb-Douglas case with   = 1, productivity growth is constant, so
productivity growth and the length of jobless recoveries are constant.
The following numerical simulation confirms the accuracy of the first-order approxima-
tion. Total Factor Productivity is constant, with At = 1. The labor supply shifter Xt
has a trend component X̄t which exactly o↵sets the growth in wages to guarantee that the
trend of employment is constant. The labor supply shifter also has a cyclical component
x̃t, which follows an AR(1) process:
Xt = X̄te
x̃t , x̃t = 0.8527 x̃t 1 + 0.0166 ⇥ N (0, 1) .
This specification matches the persistence and variance of output implied by the model to
those of US GDP.16
16Real GDP detrended with an HP filter has an auto-correlation at one lag of 0.8527 and a standard
deviation of 0.0166. Detrended output in logarithms equals x
t







and labor productivity has only a trend and no cycle. Matching the summary statistics of output consists
simply of using the same parameters for the cyclical component of the labor supply shifter.
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Given these exogenous variables, the model determines the path of the other variables,
including output and employment. Define a trough of a quantity when it has two previous
quarters of decrease and two succeeding quarters of increase and a jobless recovery when
the trough of labor lags the trough of output. The frequency of jobless recoveries is:
P (jobless recovery of length n at t) = # {jobless recoveries of length n at t}
# {recoveries at t} .
Figure 1.4 plots this frequency of jobless recoveries for 100,000 paths of x̃t: as the cost
of Information Technologies decreases, the probability of a jobless recovery is larger and
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Figure 1.4: The probability of a jobless recovery increases with time.
The special case of the model clarifies the importance of Assumptions 1 and 2 to match
the structural changes. It abstracts from business cycles and a recession is simply an
upward or downward scaling of all variables. Yet, the literature on the “cleaning e↵ects
of recessions,” such as Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998),
suggests that downturns are special times for restructuring production. The next section
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relaxes the simplifying assumptions and examines the implications of the model in the
general case.
1.4 Short-term predictions
This section considers the general version of the model, with positive hiring costs and accu-
mulation of capital. Compared to the special case of the model above, the main di↵erence
is the firm’s choice of the optimal time to fire workers. Firms know that nonroutine jobs are
expanding in the medium-term. Instead of firing workers in nonroutine jobs during reces-
sions and paying a hiring cost in the recovery, firms hoard or retain nonroutine jobs during
the recession. In contrast, routine jobs are declining and do not imply hiring costs in the
recovery. The burden of adjustment falls on routine jobs. The interaction between hiring
costs and the secular decline implies that routine job losses are concentrated in recessions
during the technological upgrading phase.
1.4.1 Calibration
The calibration of the model uses the same values for the elasticity   and the rate of
decrease   as Section 1.3.3. The hiring costs are between zero and one quarter of wages
initial wages w1947.17 The share of non-computer capital is ↵ = 0.3, the standard share of
capital in aggregate income. The nonroutine share   = 0.39 of aggregate output is from the
Current Population Survey in 2007, identifying workers as nonroutine if they are below the
median of an index of routinization defined in subsection 1.4.3.18 The quarterly discount
factor is ✓ = 0.99. The elasticity of labor supply is " = 1, consistent with Keane (2011,
17This value is consistent with previous literature: the adjustment costs in Berger (2012, page 23) are 7
months of wages. In the calibration with US GDP, spending on hiring costs is at most 0.2% of GDP.
18Multiplying the nonroutine share of labor income of 56 percent in 2007 by the labor share of income
of 70 percent yields   = 0.392.
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page 1042). The depreciation of non-computer capital is  NC = 1.5% and the depreciation
of computer capital is  C = 7.5% (6% and 30% in annual terms). Henceforth, the model
considers only TFP shocks. The labor supply shifter has no cyclicality and grows at a rate
that ensures a constant trend in employment.
Parameter ↵       cNR, cR ✓ "  C  NC
Value 0.3 0.39 0.31 1.67 0, 0.1, or 0.8 0.99 1 7.5% 1.5%
Table 1.2: Parameter values for the calibration of the model.
1.4.2 Acceleration of routinization in simulations
The model is analytically intractable and requires a numerical solution. This subsection
illustrates a property of the model with numerical simulations: routine jobs are more
responsive to a recession than nonroutine jobs. This subsection uses symmetric hiring
costs, with cNR = cR = c.
The behavior of routine jobs during a recession has three parts: a trend component
and two cyclical components. The trend component corresponds to the secular decline in
routine jobs. The frictionless cyclical component corresponds to the hypothetical response
of routine jobs to the recession in the absence of adjustment costs (c = 0). The frictional
cyclical component corresponds to the additional response of routine jobs to the recession
with frictions, e.g. to the response of routine jobs with adjustment costs versus without
adjustment costs. The first two components, trend and cycle without frictions, are present
in the special case of the model. The third component, cycle with frictions, is due to
intertemporal substitution in the firm’s behavior.
The specification for TFP shocks follows the standard AR(1) process in Kydland and
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Prescott (1982):
logAt = 0.95 logAt 1 + 0.009 ⇥ N (0, 1) .
These simulations use a path for TFP with no trend growth. (Note that this calibra-
tion of TFP shocks concerns only these simulations, while the fit of US data in the next
subsection computes the implied TFP shocks directly from the data.) The simulations use
300 paths for TFP At and solve two models, without and with adjustment costs (c = 0 or






the solution to path i of the TFP series.
The simulations confirm that the burden of adjustment of a TFP shock falls on routine
occupations more than on nonroutine occupations. The elasticity of employment with
respect to negative TFP shocks is the coe cient of a regression of   logLJ,cNR,t on   logAt,
for   logAt < 0, J = NR,R, and c = 0, 0.1. The elasticity of employment with respect to
TFP shocks in the technological upgrading phase is also similar without adjustment costs:
0.71 for routine jobs and 0.72 for nonroutine jobs. With symmetric adjustment costs, the
elasticity of routine jobs is 0.31, six times higher than the elasticity of nonroutine jobs at
0.05.
1.4.3 Acceleration of routinization in a fit to US GDP
An alternative to the numerical simulations is to fit the model with US GDP. The adjust-
ment costs are cNR = 0.8, which correspond to one quarter of wages at the beginning of
the period, and cR = 0. The simplifying assumption of zero routine hiring costs implies
that no cyclical force holds back the hiring of routine occupations in the recovery.19
The growth in the labor supply shifter Xt requires delicate attention. Recent recoveries
19Zero routine hiring costs imply that aggregate employment responds to a recession, whereas routine
hiring costs with one quarter of wages would prevent firing of workers in routine jobs during early recessions
and imply acyclical employment.
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are not only jobless but also slow (Gaĺı, Smets and Wouters, 2012): output recovers faster
after early recessions than recent ones. For a given recovery in output, recent recoveries last
longer. A constant growth in the disutility of labor supply would imply that the household
is less willing to work in recent recoveries than in earlier ones, which would bias in favor
of jobless recoveries. To remove this labor supply mechanism and decrease the chances of
matching jobless recoveries, the calibration specifies a growth rate for Xt of 3.8% before
1985, larger than the growth rate of 1.71% after 1985. Over the whole period, the trend of
employment is constant.
The numerical solution computes the shocks to TFP At that match US GDP exactly.
Specifically, the characterization of the equilibrium in Appendix A.1 gives n equations with
n + 1 unknowns for each time period, the extra unknown being the TFP shock. To pin
down the model, the numerical solution uses output as an additional series and obtains n
equations in n unknowns. This approach matches output by construction and computes
the TFP shocks that are exactly consistent with output. It also avoids computing a nested
fixed point and allows an e cient calibration that solves in a few seconds.20
This calibration is similar to the growth accounting exercise of imputing the “Solow
residuals” as unobserved TFP shocks. In both approaches, the model and the regression
fit the path of output perfectly by computing the implied TFP shocks. This calibration
is not a test of the model, since the path of output is taken from the data, but illustrates
the mechanism of nonroutine hoarding during recent recessions in perfect foresight. Berger
(2012) uses a similar approach and computes the path of aggregate-level TFP shocks that
are exactly consistent with output during the 2007 recession.
The key mechanism in the model is the di↵erential behavior of routine and nonroutine
jobs. Using the calibration with US GDP, Figure 1.5 illustrates this di↵erence in the
20See Conlon (2010) for time-e cient solutions of constrained optimization problems using the AMPL
software.
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calibration of the model over the last four decades. The firm hoards nonroutine occupations
during recessions, rather than firing them in a recession and hiring them again in a recovery.
This hoarding causes the firm to fire workers in routine occupations more than without
nonroutine hoarding. In all the recessions of Figure 1.5, the firm hoards nonroutine jobs
and adjusts with routine jobs. In recent decades, a recession accelerates the secular decrease
in routine jobs.
Comparing this di↵erential behavior during recent recessions to the data requires the
Current Population Survey matched to the Occupational Information Network. For a
measure of routinization, Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) classify routine jobs as high in
automation, low in personal interactions, and low in creativity. An index of routinization
combines these three measures:
routinizationj = automationj   assisting othersj   level of creativityj,
where j indexes occupations. I aggregate employment into employment quartiles by rou-
tinization index for each peak year, divide employment by working-age population,21 and
normalize the employment share quartiles at 100 in the peak year.
Figure 1.6 is the empirical counterpart of Figure 1.5 and plots the time-series of each
quartile by decade.22 The least routinizable occupations, in the first quartile, represent
nonroutine and expanding jobs: they have the largest medium-term increase in all decades
and never decrease during recessions. Occupations that are neither routine nor nonroutine,
in the second quartile, represent cyclical jobs: they increase during expansions and decrease
during recessions. The most routinizable occupations, in the third and fourth quartiles,
21I use the series USAWFPNA from the Federal Reserve Economic Database.
22The occupational classification of the CPS changed every decade. The 2003-2010 panel uses the 6-digit




























































































































































































































































































































represent declining jobs, intensive in automation and with little scope for personal inter-
actions or creativity. Employment in these occupations follows a step function: flat or
declining in the 1990 and 2000 expansions and decreasing during recessions. Between 2007
and 2010, employment in upper quartiles of routinization decreased by 5.8 million jobs,
around 80% of job losses over the period. For 1990 and 2001, routine occupations also
represent around 80% job losses.
1.4.4 Jobless recoveries
The calibration of the model to fit US GDP also matches jobless recoveries. As a conse-
quence of hoarding nonroutine jobs during a recession, the firm dishoards them during the
recovery. During the recession, the firm has a stock of nonroutine jobs that is temporarily
too high. To return to the ideal allocation that would prevail without adjustment costs, the
firm refrains from hiring workers in nonroutine occupations for some time during the recov-
ery. Routine jobs adjust freely: they return to peak in early recoveries and to the declining
trend in late recoveries. Routine jobs are V-shaped in early recessions and L-shaped in late
recessions. After early recessions, the firm dishoards nonroutine jobs and hires routine jobs
back to peak, leading to a “jobful” recovery. After late recessions, the firm also dishoards
nonroutine jobs but routine jobs return to their declining trend. Aggregate employment
is stagnant even as output recovers, leading to a “jobless” recovery. The jobless recovery
lasts until the firm exits the dishoarding regime and starts hiring workers in nonroutine
jobs again.
Figure 1.7 shows the recovery of employment in two numerical exercises. The first exer-
cise solves a model without computers, where the productivity bt of the computer-producing
sector is constant at the 1947 level. The second exercise solves a model where the price of
computers falls at rate   = 18%. Without computers, the average recovery of employment



































































































































































































































































































































average of 0.71% for early recessions to an average of -0.04% for late recessions.
The model over-predicts the joblessness of the recovery after the 2007 recession com-
pared to the data in Figure 1.1. One possible explanation is credit market disruptions
caused firms to lay o↵ more workers (Chodorow-Reich, 2014). With the end of the finan-
cial crisis, firms may have used their credit access to hire back laid o↵ workers, a mechanism
that is absent from the model. Another possible explanation is that the model pools to-
gether nonroutine jobs at the top and bottom of the skill distribution and both types of
jobs are hoarded during the recession. In reality, nonroutine jobs at the bottom of the
distribution may be fired during the recession and hired back in the recovery, causing the























1948 1953 1957 1960 1969 1973 1981 1990 2001 2007
Without computers With computers
Figure 1.7: The model with computers predicts weaker recoveries of employment after
recent recessions compared to the model without computers.
Details: recovery of employment for a given recovery of output of 5%, as in Figure 1.1.
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1.5 Conclusion
This chapter studies the link between computers and the behavior of the labor market
in the medium-term and the short-term. The model matches three structural changes in
the labor market since the 1980s: a shift away from routine occupations, a productivity
speed-up, and a decline in the labor share of income. The model also matches two cyclical
changes: routine job losses concentrated in recessions and jobless recoveries.
The model predicts that these labor market changes should occur in all countries, since
the decline in the price of computers was a global trend. Using industry-level data from the
United States, Japan, and Europe, Michaels, Natraj and Reenen (2010) find that industries
that invest more in computers also increase demand for nonroutine, highly-educated workers
and decrease demand for routine, middle-educated workers. Furthermore, countries that
invest more in computers, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and
Japan, have also experienced jobless recoveries since the 1980s. Countries may invest
di↵erently in computers because, as Bloom, Sadun and Reenen (2007) suggested, computers
complement the managerial practices in the United States but not in Europe. The model
could capture these di↵erences across countries i with a parameter  i in front of computer
capitalKC,i,t. This parameter would a↵ect the relative price of computers and could account
for the distinct timing of computer adoption and labor market changes. Using the model
to fit the cross-country evidence is left for future research.
Are jobless recoveries the new norm? Jaimovich and Siu (2012) think so,23 but this
chapter suggests a qualified conclusion: if the decrease in the price of computers slows
down before the next recession, the following recovery may well be “jobful.”
If the next recession occurs before this slowdown, the recovery may be jobless and this
chapter suggests a new tradeo↵ for monetary authorities during jobless recoveries. In a
23“Jobless recoveries may be the new norm,” from VoxEU article “Jobless recoveries and the disappear-
ance of routine occupations” of 6 November 2012.
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more general model with sticky prices, the interest rate is the cost of present consumption
and also the cost of capital. If the monetary authority keeps interest rates low, it encourages
firms to invest in computer capital instead of creating routine jobs; if it raises interest rates,
there may be no recovery at all. An analysis of this tradeo↵ is left for future research.
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Chapter 2
Electricity adoption and the Great
Depression
2.1 Introduction
The first chapter of this dissertation focused on changes in the US labor market since the
1980s: structural changes such as a shift away from routine and automated occupations, a
productivity speed-up, and a decline in the labor share of income; and cyclical changes such
as routine job losses concentrated in recessions and jobless recoveries. The US labor market
also experienced structural and cyclical changes in the 1920s and 1930s. States with higher
rates of electricity adoption also decreased more the share of dexterity-intensive, repetitive
occupations that follow explicit rules, such as laborers on the factory floor who could be
replaced by the conveyor belt, compared to occupations with limited scope for replacement
with electrical machinery, such as managers and clerks (Gray, 2013). Furthermore, the
growth rate of labor productivity increased during the 1930s (Field, 2003). Finally, the
US labor market also experienced jobless recoveries from recessions in the 1930s: the New
York Times invented the expression in 1938 (see the literature review at the end of the
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introduction).
In contrast to the first chapter, which focused on theory and computers since the 1980s,
this chapter focuses on identification and electricity in the 1930s. Testing the model in the
context of electricity has several advantages compared to computers: electricity prices vary
across regions depending on the source of power (hydroelectric or coal) but computers prices
are the same everywhere; electricity is a homogenous good requiring no hedonic price ad-
justments; and electricity is measured with consumption instead of initial investment. This
test also disentangles technology from competing explanations for labor market changes in
the 1980s, such as o↵shoring (Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin, 2013) and unionization (Berger,
2012): in the 1930s, o↵shoring was infeasible and unionization rates were increasing (Farber
and Western, 2000).
This chapter uses the same model as the first chapter, replacing computers with electric-
ity, the 1980s with the 1930s, and the occupations that can be replaced by computers with
those that can be replaced by electrical machinery. The literature on economic history of
electrification supports the main assumptions of the model: a decrease in the price of elec-
tricity and substitutability between electrical machinery and some types of jobs. Gordon
(1992, Table 1) estimates that the real price of electricity decreased at 7% per year between
1899 and 1948, while the Historical Statistics of the United States provide an estimate of
5.8% between 1902 and 1950 (see Appendix B.2.3). Goldin and Katz (2010, page 112) cite
the example of laborers on the factory floor who were replaced by the conveyor belt, while
Jerome (1934) documents the introduction of labor-saving machinery in many industries.
To emphasize the parallels with the recent period, this chapter also labels these jobs as
routine, even though the occupations may be di↵erent.
As an overview of the medium-term implications, the model matches the structural
changes in the 1930s with these two assumptions. As electrical machinery becomes more
competitive compared to workers, firms replace one with the other. The trend of automation
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causes employment to shift away from routine occupations, which substitute technology,
and into nonroutine occupations, which complement technology. The same decrease in
the price of electricity has a larger e↵ect on the growth rate of labor productivity when
electricity is cheap—because firms replace workers in routine occupations with electrical
machinery—than when electricity is expensive—because firms forego investment in electri-
cal machinery and hire workers in routine occupations instead. The price of electricity has
a level e↵ect: the same decrease in the price from a lower level causes a higher increase
in the growth rate of labor productivity, which explains the productivity speedup of the
1920s and 1930s.
As an overview of the short-term implications, the model matches the cyclical changes
with the additional assumption of labor market frictions. Firms know that they will have
to hire more nonroutine jobs in the medium-term. If they destroy nonroutine jobs during
the recession, they know that they will have to hire them back in the recovery and pay
a hiring cost. To avoid the hiring costs, firms hoard nonroutine jobs during the recession
and the burden of adjustment falls on routine jobs. Routine jobs do not entail this hiring
cost in the recovery because of their declining trend. Firms did not lay o↵ workers in
nonroutine occupations during the recession, so they do not hire them back in the recovery.
They may hire back workers in routine occupations but, since the medium-term trend of
employment in routine occupations is decreasing, routine jobs do not recover back to peak.
Total employment is constant, even as output recovers, which is the definition of a jobless
recovery.
The crucial assumption underlying this behavior of the model is the substitutability be-
tween routine jobs and electrical machinery. If electrical machinery is equally substitutable
to routine and nonroutine jobs, as with a Cobb-Douglas production function, then the
model predicts a constant trend for the routine share of employment, the labor share of in-
come, and productivity growth. When a business cycle shock vanishes, the economy returns
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to the constant trend, so recessions and recoveries have the same dynamics independently
of the price of electricity.
This chapter uses the labor share of income to test this crucial assumption of substi-
tutability between routine jobs and electrical machinery. If the elasticity of substitution
between electrical machinery and routine jobs is greater than 1, the labor share of income
should decrease as electricity becomes cheaper; if the elasticity of substitution between
electrical machinery and all jobs equals 1—as in a Cobb-Douglas production function—the
labor share of income should be unrelated to the price of electricity.
The ideal test of the model would be a random assignment of input prices across regions
and a subsequent analysis of the labor market outcomes. Compared to this ideal test, the
first part of the identification strategy uses geography as an instrument for the change in
the price of electricity in the 1930s. Electricity at this time came either from hydroelectric
power or coal power. Hydroelectric power had high e ciency in 1930, extracting 90% of
the potential energy of falling water, and had few opportunities for cost savings. Coal
power had low e ciency, extracting 25% of the thermal energy of coal, and had many
opportunities for cost savings.1 The price of electricity decreased in regions with coal
power, such as New Jersey, but not in regions with hydroelectric power, such as California.
A state’s initial loading on coal power is an instrument for the supply-side change in the
price of electricity.
The second part of the identification strategy consists of choosing the concrete industry,
whose location decisions are orthogonal to the geography of electricity prices. Concrete
plants produce a non-traded good and locate near their customers rather than near cheap
electricity. The industry has high transport costs (ready-mix concrete, for example, has to
be conveyed to the final location in a few hours) and is the third most non-traded industry
1National Electric Light Association (1931, page 43).
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according to a Gini locational coe cient in 1935.2 Concrete plants locate in New Jersey
or California to be close to their customers, after which they react to the change in the
price of electricity in each state. Measurements of labor market outcomes for the concrete
industry provide a quasi-experiment to assess the causal e↵ect of technical progress in
electric utilities on downstream industries.
This chapter uses the universe of concrete plants from the Census of Manufactures,
from 1929 to 1935, digitized for the first time for this project. It has information on
employment, wage-bill, revenue, cost of electricity, consumption of electricity, and the
number and horsepower of electric motors. Linking plants across years produces a panel of
742 continuing plants.
The instrumental variable regressions document that technical progress in the electric
utility industry caused a decline in the labor share of income of the concrete industry
and an increase in the use of electric motors, consistent with the mechanism of capital-
labor substitution in the model. As a reminder, a Cobb-Douglas production function
has constant factor shares: a decrease in the price of an input leaves the other input
shares una↵ected. The empirical result in this chapter is consistent only with a production
function where the elasticity of substitution between electricity and labor is greater than
1. This substitutability is the crucial assumption of the theoretical model, which can in
turn explain other features of the 1930s: the productivity speedup, structural changes in
employment, and jobless recoveries. To buttress the technological explanation for labor
2The Gini locational coe cient (Holmes and Stevens, 2004, page 2810) measures the di↵erence between
the distribution of economic activity compared to population. Denote the number of states with N , the
share of population in state k as pop
k
, and the share of activity (number of plants or total employment)
state k for industry i as act
ki
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market changes, this chapter also estimates the e↵ect on other variables. The instrumental
variable and reduced-form regressions suggest that technical progress in the electric utility
industry caused a decline in employment and in average wages of concrete plants.
Related literature. This chapter relates to several strands of the literature: electri-
fication during the 1930s, the parallels between electricity and computers, and the jobless
recovery from the Great Depression. On electrification in the 1930s, several studies have
used aggregate-level data or Ordinary Least Squares to assess the e↵ects of electrification on
the labor market. Gray (2013) studied worker-level evidence from the first half of the 20th
century and found that electrification was correlated with a shift away from occupations
intensive in dexterity skills, similar to the findings of Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) for
computerization in the late 20th century. Field (2003) used aggregate-level growth account-
ing and argued that the 1930s had an unprecedented increase in TFP and were the “most
technologically progressive decade of the century” because of electricity. Woolf (1984) used
industry-level data from the Census of Manufactures between 1909 and 1929 and found
that “firms sought labor-saving and capital-using techniques in response to cheaper energy
... [and reduced] labor’s share of income.” The evidence from previous studies is consistent
with the thesis of this chapter, whose contribution is to use plant-level data and a new
instrument for the adoption of electricity.
This chapter also relates to the literature on the parallels between electricity and com-
puters. David (1990) argued that both electricity and computers generated productivity
growth in the wider economy after a long lag, causing the productivity speedups of the
1920s and 1990s. Syverson (2013) found that the speedup in labor productivity of the
1990s was of a similar magnitude as that of the 1920s, documented by Kendrick (1961,
page 71).3
3Field (2011, page 25) questioned the exact dating of the productivity speedup of Kendrick because of
his choice of dates: “The problem is that Kendrick compared a fully employed economy in 1929 with a
1937 economy in which 14.3 percent of the labor force was still out of work ... If we seek a peacetime peak-
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This chapter also relates to the literature on the jobless recovery and technological
unemployment during the Great Depression. Irving Fisher in 1928 proposed technology as
an explanation for the jobless recovery from the 1927 recession: “increased productivity
per worker, aided by improved machinery and organization and more willing labor, is
partly responsible for the anomaly of growing unemployment during an extended period
of increased business activity” (quoted by Woirol, 1996, page 28). Keynes coined the
term of “technological unemployment”: “unemployment due to our discovery of means
of economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for
labour.” Frances Perkins, secretary of the Department of Labor, stated in a Congressional
testimony in 1935 that “you would be surprised at the number of labor-saving devices which
have been introduced in industry in the last 2 or 3 years” (Committee on Finance, 1935,
page 206). The New York Times invented the expression “jobless recovery” in the 1930s:
“During November [of 1938, the Works Progress Administration] rolls showed some decline,
but it was slight enough to make observers wonder whether the country were experiencing a
’jobless recovery.”’4 Relative to this literature, the contribution of this chapter is to suggest
the decline in the price of electricity as the reason for technological unemployment.
2.2 Data and definitions
This chapter assesses the e↵ect of technical progress in electric utilities on labor market
variables. It uses two data sources at the state-level from publications by the Census
Bureau and at the plant-level from micro-data at the National Archives. The Census
Bureau published a state-level summary of the electric light and power industry in 1927
to-peak comparison, we are better served by choosing as an endpoint 1941, when unemployment, although
still averaging 9.9 percent, was closer to what it was in 1929 but before war spending or production could
seriously have influenced the economy.”
4Article “Jobless recovery?” of 27 November 1938.
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and 1937. It also published state-level information on other variables, such as the generation
of electricity (hydroelectric or coal) in the Statistical Abstracts of the United States and
wages in manufacturing in 1929 and 1935 in the state- and industry-level publications of
the Census of Manufactures.
The plant-level dataset is from the Census of Manufactures in 1929 and 1935, which
covers the universe of manufacturing plants with sales above five thousand dollars.5 This
dataset is at the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington D.C. Two
barriers prevent the wider use of this dataset: the schedules are in paper or microfilm
format and the National Archives protect them with in-house access only. This chapter
focuses on the concrete industry, digitized for the first time for this project. I scanned all
the microfilm schedules (around 2,500 for 1929 and 1,100 for 1935). The archivists marked
as lost one microfilm roll with 300 plants in 1935 for states Alabama to Iowa but I was
able to locate a backup copy in a di↵erent location. No schedules from the Census of
Manufactures are missing from my sample. A professional data entry firm tabulated these
schedules into electronic format. I verified the tabulations and corrected outliers, such as
missing commas in the separation of cents and dollars. I also cleaned the names of states,
counties and cities. The Census Bureau had no unique plant identifier and I matched the
plants across years based on their name, location and ownership (see Appendix 2.2). From
the 3,500 plants present in both 1929 and 1935, I obtained a panel of 742 continuing plants.
The concrete industry has three advantages for identification. First, it sells non-traded
products (Syverson, 2004), which guarantees that concrete plants locate near their cus-
tomers and their geographic distribution is exogenous to the regional variation in the price
of electricity. Second, the concrete industry is intensive in electricity: continuing plants
spent on average 1.3% of revenue in electricity in 1929. According to the electricity share
5This threshold in 1929 corresponds to around $66 thousand today and is high above the average sales
for the concrete industry of $38 thousand in 1929 prices.
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of value added at the industry level, concrete is in the upper third of manufacturing indus-
tries that use the most electricity. Third, concrete plants are small and bought all of their
electricity from the grid: the Census Bureau asked about generation of electricity, which is
zero for all firms in the balanced panel.
The Census asked about production by quantity and value, employment, wages, number
of electric motors, horsepower of electric motors, kilowatt-hours purchased and their cost,
and kilowatt-hours generated. The top panel of Table 3.2 shows summary statistics for
continuing concrete plants. The concrete industry has many small plants, with an average
of 13 employees. The bottom panel shows summary statistics for the change between
1929 and 1935. On average, concrete plants had a decrease in output, the labor share,
employment, the price of electricity, and kilowatts-purchased. They also had an average
increase in the number and horsepower of electric motors.
Concrete plants use labor-saving electrical machinery at several stages of production of
concrete: machinery for crushing and grinding stones into a finer aggregate, machinery for
pumping and unloading units to convey cement, electric power shovels and conveyor belts
or elevators to move materials, mixing machines that produce a more homogenous product
with less cement compared to manual mixing, and waste-heat boilers (Jerome, 1934, page
80; Orchard, 1962, page 404).
The concrete industry had a decline in the labor share of revenue of 14 percentage points,
from 28.7% in 1909 to 14.4% in 1939, illustrated in Figure 2.1. Half of this decrease, or 7
percentage points, occurred during the Great Depression. The other half occurred during
the other recessions of 1927 and 1937. The labor share of value added also decreased but
its measure is less precise, as value added may include or omit spending in fuel and energy
depending on the years.
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Summary statistics for 1929
Number Employment Average Electricity Electricity and Kilowatt
of of all employment share fuel share hours
plants plants per plant of income of income purchased
742 9,367 13 1.3% 2.4% 17,766
Summary statistics for the change between 1929 and 1935
Change from 1929 to 1935 (log-points) Mean S.d.
Output value -0.56 0.87
Labor share -0.11 0.56
Employment -0.26 0.80
State-level cost of electricity -0.23 0.06
Number of electric motors 0.14 0.61
Horsepower of electric motors 0.12 0.77

















1909 1929 1933 1939
Year
Figure 2.1: The decline in the labor share of revenue of the concrete industry accelerated
during the Great Depression.
Details: wages divided by revenue every two years from 1909 to 1939, from the publication Census of
Manufactures for the year 1939. Shaded areas are NBER recessions.
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2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Overview of the model
This subsection summarizes the production side of the theoretical model. The General
Equilibrium properties of the model (household side and equilibrium of the labor, product,
and capital markets) are omitted here and the interested reader is referred to the first
chapter.
Plant i rents two types of capital, electric capital KE,i,t and non-electric capital KNE,i,t.
The first assumption is a long-term decrease in the rental rate of electric capital.
Assumption 12. The rental rate rE,i,t of electric capital decreases exogenously with time:
rE,i,t & in t.
Plant i hires workers in two types of occupations, routine occupations LR,i,t and non-
routine occupations LNR,i,t . The production function of plant i is:



















where Ai,t is Total Factor productivity. The production function has constant returns to
scale, with ↵ +   +   = 1. This production function has Cobb-Douglas aggregation of
three factors: non-electric capital KNE,i,t, employment in nonroutine occupations LNR,i,t,
and a third factor, which is a Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution aggregate between electric
capital KE,i,t and employment in routine occupations LR,i,t. The second crucial assumption
is gross substitutability of electric capital and employment in routine occupations tasks in
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the production function:
Assumption 13. The elasticity of substitution between electric capital and employment in
routine occupations is greater or equal to 1:
    1.
Plant i operates under perfect competition and has profits
profitsi,t = pi,tYi,t   wi,t (LNR,i,t + LR,i,t)   rNE,i,tKNE,i,t   rE,i,tKE,i,t,
where wi,t is the wage, pi,t is the price of output. The firm maximizes the present value of
profits, discounted with the market interest rate rt.
Like the first chapter, the wage wi,t is the same for routine and nonroutine occupa-
tions because the household is perfectly indi↵erent between the two tasks. Unlike the first
chapter, hiring costs are zero in this setting, which guarantees a closed-form solution. The
interested reader is referred to the first chapter for more details on the supply side of the
labor market and the more general version of the model with adjustment costs.
2.3.2 Testable predictions
The first chapter shows that the General Equilibrium model with hiring costs has five
predictions for the labor market: (1) the labor productivity speeds up, (2) employment
shifts away from routine occupations and into nonroutine occupations, (3) the labor share
of income declines, (4) recessions accelerate the structural decline in routine occupations,
(5) recoveries from recessions are jobless, i.e. employment recovers slower than output.
Testing the theory requires choosing the predictions to test with the available data.
One prediction of the model—routinization of production—is the subject of Gray (2013).
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She merged the worker-level Census of Population from 1900 to 1950 to the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles. She defined an occupation as routine if it required high dexterity and
low manual or clerical skills. She found that states with faster electrification also shifted
away from these routine occupations, similar to the findings of Autor, Levy and Murnane
(2003) for computerization in the late 20th century and consistent with the thesis in this
chapter.
The prediction of acceleration of routinization cannot be tested with this dataset. This
prediction requires high-frequency information on employment by detailed occupations,
which is unavailable in the Census of Manufactures (see Appendix B.1.3). If electricity
complements nonroutine occupations, the positive impact on nonroutine jobs could o↵set
the negative impact on routine jobs, which biases against finding a positive net e↵ect.
Two other predictions—labor productivity speedup and jobless recoveries—find some
support in the data but have measurement problems. Measures of quantity productivity
among concrete plants have poor quality: the Census Bureau asked plants to report the
tons of concrete but plants often reported other units. Table B.2 in the Appendix sug-
gests that the decrease in the price of electricity caused an increase in labor productivity,
with a coe cient that is statistically significant at the 10% level. On jobless recoveries,
an unreported regression of employment between 1933 and 1935 suggests that regions with
cheaper electricity also had a slower recovery in employment, but the coe cients are statis-
tically insignificant because output is the major determinant of employment and omitting
it increases the variance of the regression.
The last prediction bears on the labor share of income. This variable has accurate
measures in the Census of Manufactures: the Census Bureau verified the schedules, asked
plants reporting high or low wages to confirm the values and remove typographical errors.
Testing this prediction on the labor share of income is the focus of the rest of this chapter.
The period covered is 1929 and 1935 for three reasons. First, the plant schedules of
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the Census of Manufactures survived only for this period and the remaining years were
destroyed. Access to plant-level data is important in order to link plants across years
and avoid compositional bias due to the turnover of plants. Second, the model predicts
that recessions accelerate the medium-term decline in routine jobs. Deep recessions should
render this pattern of capital-labor substitution clearer than mild recessions. Third, the
major turmoil in labor markets during the Great Depression provides variation in the
dependent variables and allows a more precise estimation of the regression coe cients.
2.3.3 Linear regressions
The model implies the following non-linear equations for the labor share of income and the
electric capital-labor ratio (see Appendix B.3):
wj,tLj,t
pj,tYj,t



























where j indexes a unit of observation such as firms i or regions k (see Appendix B.3 for
proofs).
These equations include a “level e↵ect:” when electrical machinery is too expensive
and   > 1, the non-linear term vanishes from the equation and the labor share of income
is constant. When technology is too expensive, a decrease in the price of electricity has
little impact on the economy, as firms prefer to hire workers instead. The “level e↵ect” was
discussed in the first chapter.
To translate these predictions into regression equations, I consider the log-linear version
of the equations. The problems in using a log-linear version of non-linear equations with a
level e↵ect are minimal because the level e↵ect is more important over decades of decrease
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in the price of the technology, rather than the six years between 1929 and 1935. The next
simulations illustrate that the log-linear regressions are an accurate approximation to the
non-linear relationships, I use the General Equilibrium model from the first chapter to
simulate 300 artificial economies. All simulations use the same parameters, equal to those
from the calibration in the first chapter, except for the rate of decrease   in the price of
electricity, which follows a uniform distribution between 1% and 18%. I solve the model



















Under the assumption   > 1, the slope coe cient should be positive for the labor share
of income and smaller than -1 for the computer capital-labor ratio. The scatter plot in
Figure 2.2 shows that the log-linear regression from the model is an accurate approximation
to the non-linear expression.
Two further di culties arise in the context of electricity. First, the rental rate rE,j,t of
electrical machinery is unobserved and I use the price of electricity in cents per kilowatt-
hour as a proxy, which implies measurement error and an attenuation bias toward zero.6
Second, the average price of electricity at the plant-level is far from the marginal price:
several forms of fixed costs (see Appendix B.2) introduce measurement error in the price of
electricity paid by concrete plants, which are small with an average of 12 employees. Fixed
costs should lose importance when considering a larger entity such as the state, whose
6The usage cost of electricity has two components: the price of electricity in kilowatt-hours and the
rental rate of an electric motor. Regional variation in the usage costs stems mostly from the price of
electricity because the rental rate of electric motors is likely to be the same for all regions. The rental rate
of an electric motor has three components: the interest rate, the price of investment, and the depreciation
rate. Each of these components should have similar values across regions: the interest rate was set by the
Federal Reserve for all regions and the electrical machinery industry was concentrated in five states which
served a national market with similar investment prices and depreciation rates.
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average price of electricity should be closer to the marginal price. The preferred measure of
the price of electricity is the state-level average price from the Census of Electric Light and
Power Stations for 1927 and 1937.7 This measure minimizes the importance of fixed costs,
making the average price closer to marginal price, and is close to the price of electricity paid
by industrial users, since power stations sold on average 69% of their current to industrial
consumers.8



















where i indexes plants, k indexes states, wi,tLi,t is the aggregate wage-bill at the plant-
level, pi,tYi,t is the total value of output at the plant-level, pE,k,t/wk,t is the change in the
price of electricity relative to the wage at the state-level, and KE,i,t/Li,t is a measure of the
electric capital-labor ratio at the plant-level. Note that the left-hand side of (2.3.6) uses
the wage at the plant-level for the concrete industry and the right-hand side uses the wage
at the state-level for all manufacturing industries. The theory predicts a > 0 and a0 <  1:
a decrease in the price of electricity or an increase in the wage cause a substitution into
electricity and a decrease in the labor share of income. The model normalizes the price
of output pi,t to 1, so other prices are in real terms. The regressions use a nominal price
with no deflator—deflating prices by a nation-wide price or wage index would a↵ect the
intercept of the regression and not the slope.
7Stigler and Friedland (1962) used this measure to assess the e↵ect of regulation on electricity prices.
To the best of my knowledge, the Census of Electric Light and Power Stations is the only source of data
for the price of electricity at the state-level during this period.
8Census of Electric Light and Power Stations, 1927, page 51.
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2.3.4 Endogeneity and an instrument
The identifying assumptions for regression equations (2.3.6) and (2.3.7) are that the average
price of electricity, of labor, and of output are close to the marginal prices and that the
error term is uncorrelated with the regressors. Then a and a0 are consistent and unbiased
estimators.
Estimating a regression of quantities on prices raises concerns about endogeneity and
is a challenge to identification: it is unclear whether the regression estimates the demand
or supply equation. This chapter is interested in the demand for electricity and requires
an instrument that shifts the electricity supply curve and not the demand curve. This
endogeneity should bias the estimation of the downward-sloping electricity demand curve
toward the upward-sloping electricity supply curve. The coe cients should be further away
from zero in Instrumental Variables (IV) compared to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). A
similar argument suggests that endogeneity also biases the coe cient on the labor share of
income toward zero because the labor share of income is decreasing in the electric capital-
labor ratio in the model.
The identification strategy to deal with the endogeneity bias consists of two parts:
using geography as an instrument for the change in the price of electricity and choosing
the non-traded industry of concrete. As an instrument for the supply-side change in the
price of electricity, this chapter uses the share of coal in the generation of electricity in
1927. In 1930, power plants extracted 90% of the potential energy of falling water and
had few opportunities for cost-saving innovations. Power plants extracted 25% of the
potential energy of burning coal to power steam turbines, had many opportunities for cost-
saving innovations.9 The generation of electricity from coal improved thanks to a “rise in
steam pressures and steam temperatures used, and ... the experimental introduction of a
9National Electric Light Association (1931, page 43).
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second working fluid in an independent cycle supplementing that of the steam.”10 These
innovations increased the thermal e ciency of fuel: “In 1928, the same amount of energy
was produced with 71 per cent less fuel than would have been required in 1904.”11
Technical progress in the generation of electricity from coal impacted regions di↵er-
ently depending on their initial dependence on this technology. Regions with access to
hydroelectric power, such as Minnesota or California, have cheap electricity but the price
of electricity is roughly constant. Regions without hydroelectric power, such as North
Dakota or New Jersey, have initially more expensive electricity but the price of electricity
decreases. Figure 2.3 illustrates the pattern of convergence across states. Figure 2.4 shows
the first-stage of the instrument at the state-level: states with initially larger dependence
on coal power also had a decrease in the relative price of electricity. The relative price of




















where the price of electricity is the average price of electricity for all consumers from the
Census of Electric Light and Power Stations in 1927 and 1937 and the wage is the industry-
wide average wage for wage-earners and salaried workers for all manufacturing firms in 1929
and 1935.
Four arguments support the validity of this instrument. First, concrete plants do not
sort geographically depending on the price of electricity: the concrete industry sells a non-
traded product and locates near its customers. Second, the instrument should a↵ect electric
utilities on the supply side of the electricity market but not concrete plants on the demand
side of the market. Third, the instrument is an initial level and the outcome variables are
10Census of Electric Light and Power Stations (1927, page 82)

























-.15 -.1 -.05 0
Change in relative price of electricity
Slope:   0.05   t-statistic: 104.97
R2:   0.97   Correlation:     99%   Observations: 300
Figure 2.2: The non-linear relationship in the model is close to a linear one for short periods
of time.



















































0 .5 1 1.5 2
Logarithm of price of electricity in 1927
Slope:  -0.30   t-statistic:  -8.50
R2:   0.66   Correlation:    -81%   Observations: 40
Figure 2.3: The price of electricity converged across states between 1927 and 1937.
The two neighboring states of Minnesota and North Dakota have a di↵erent color and a larger font. The
outlier states of Mississippi and Arizona are omitted.
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changes. Omitted variables in levels, such as the skill composition of the workforce or the
density of the road network, are di↵erenced out in the regressions. Fourth, using ratios at
the plant-level, such as labor productivity or the labor share of income, implies the absence
of that plant-level shocks that a↵ect the numerator and denominator similarly, such as
TFP shocks.
A possible violation of the exclusion restriction concerns omitted variables that change
through time. For example, cities high in hydroelectric power may attract more government
programs for dam construction, which would increase demand for concrete in regions with
hydroelectric power compared to regions with coal power. This increase in demand may be
met with the more adjustable factors, such as labor or materials. To address this concern,
I run a falsification test with the materials share of income and also run a robustness test
by dropping states with dam construction from the sample.
2.4 Results
This section presents the evidence for   > 1 and for the causal link between electricity
and the labor share of income. Concrete plants with access to cheaper electricity also
reduce their labor share of income and invest more in electricity. The results are robust to
including controls such as state-level initial GDP or the state-level share of agriculture.
2.4.1 Baseline results
Table 2.2 shows the results of the regressions using the change in the price of electricity
relative to wages, in OLS, IV, and reduced-form. The coe cient on the price of electricity
is between 0.6 and 0.9 and is statistically and economically significant. It should be positive
under the assumption   > 1 and zero under   = 1. This regression supports the crucial
assumption in the model. The F -statistic for the first-stage is in the confidence region above
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10. Electricity has an IV coe cient with a higher magnitude than the OLS coe cient. This
di↵erence is consistent with the importance of demand shocks in the market for electricity
during the Depression. The reduced-form regressions show an e↵ect of initial dependence on
coal power on the labor share of income: initially higher dependence on coal, which causes a
decrease in the price of electricity, also causes a decrease in the labor share of income. The
reduced-form coe cient on coal power is economically and statistically significant. The
standard errors in all tables are clustered at the state-level.
With the elasticity of the labor share with respect to the price of electricity of 2 from
the IV regressions, the predicted change in the labor share of revenue is   log (wL/pY ) =
 0.23 ⇥ 2 =  0.46. The labor share of revenue for the aggregate-level concrete industry
declined from 24.4% in 1929 to 17.4% in 1935. The IV estimates predict that the labor
share of revenue should decrease to 24.4% ⇥ exp ( 0.46) = 15.4%, a magnitude similar
to the data for the aggregate-level concrete industry. The predicted change of  0.46 is
larger than the change in the labor share of revenue of continuing plants, at  0.11 from the
summary statistics. This thought experiment assesses the net contribution of electricity
and holds constant other factors, such as wages that may have national-level shifters such
as the National Recovery Act of 1933.
2.4.2 Robustness
This section extends the baseline regressions above and shows robustness checks that sup-
port the technological explanation. To ensure that the variation in the relative price of
electricity stems from the absolute price of electricity rather than the wage, Table 2.3
shows the regressions of the labor share with the absolute price of electricity. The electric-
ity coe cient is similar and the F -statistic for the first-stage is still above 10.
Table 2.4 shows the e↵ect of cheaper electricity on employment. Cheaper electricity





























































0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Coal share of power in 1927
Slope:    t-statistic: 
R2:   Correlation: %   Observations: 
Figure 2.4: First-stage regression: an initially higher share of coal in power generation in
1927 causes a subsequent decrease in the relative price of electricity.
Larger circles represent states with more plants but the regression line has the same weight for all states.
Dependent variable:   log (wi,tLi,t/pi,tYi,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form




Constant -0.184*** -0.335*** 0.0167
(0.0326) (0.0923) (0.0445)
Observations 733 733 733
R-squared 0.008 0.011
First-stage F -statistic 14.89
Robust standard errors in parentheses (state-level clustering, 44 clusters)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.2: Baseline regression: the decrease in the price of electricity caused a decrease in
the labor share of income.
Details: a regression of the relative price of electricity on the instrument, at the state-level without clus-
tering, provides the first-stage F -statistic for the IV regression.
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in reduced-form, suggesting that technology may help accounting for reduced job creation
and high unemployment during the Great Depression. Table 2.5 presents the results for
the average wage. The decrease in the price of electricity put downward pressure on wages.
The decrease in wages may be an additional channel for the adoption of technology to a↵ect
the macroeconomy.
Tables 2.6 shows a falsification test with the materials share of revenue. One might be
concerned that, since revenue shares sum to one, the e↵ect of electricity on the labor share
may be a arithmetic consequence of the increase in the share of materials or fuel. These
concerns are mitigated by a statistically significant e↵ect of electricity on the labor share
of revenue and a statistically insignificant on the shares for materials. Table B.3 in the
Appendix shows similar results for the fuel share of revenue.
To ensure that the initial level of coal dependence is not capturing an alternative channel
such as a demand shock, Figure 2.5 plots the change in building permits at the state-level
between 1929 and 193512 against the initial coal dependence. The coal share of power is
uncorrelated with this measure of a demand shock.
The baseline results are also robust to other specifications: using the fixed character-
istic of hydropower potential as an instrument instead of the coal share of power in 1927,
controlling for the price of inputs, using the labor share of value added instead of income,
controlling for a county-level measure of the business cycle, for state-level GDP in 1929, and
for the state-level share of population working in agriculture in 1920. These regressions are
in Appendix B.4, which also estimates a positive e↵ect of cheaper electricity on quantity
labor productivity.
12The Bureau of Labor Statistics compiled building permits by year from 1921 to 1940 for 262 large
cities in the United States. This dataset was digitized by Kimbrough and Snowden (2007).
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Dependent variable:   log (wi,tLi,t/pi,tYi,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form




Constant 0.058 0.298* 0.0167
(0.0667) (0.181) (0.0445)
Observations 733 733 733
R-squared 0.012 0.011
First-stage F -statistic 16.72
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.3: The baseline results are robust to using the absolute price of electricity instead
of the relative price.
Dependent variable:   log (Li,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form




Constant -0.248*** -0.488*** -0.130***
(0.0571) (0.136) (0.0386)
Observations 733 733 733
R-squared 0 0.005
First-stage F -statistic 14.89
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.4: The decrease in the price of electricity may have caused a decrease in employ-
ment.
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Dependent variable:   log (wi,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form




Constant -0.326*** -0.157 -0.335***
(0.0408) (0.121) (0.0296)
Observations 733 733 733
R-squared 0.005 0.007
First-stage F -statistic 16.72
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.5: The decrease in the price of electricity caused a decrease in wages.
Dependent variable:   log (Materialsi,t/pi,tYi,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form




Constant 0.00994 -0.0735 0.0621
(0.0308) (0.0886) (0.0387)
Observations 704 704 704
R-squared 0 0.002
First-stage F -statistic 14.89
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.6: Falsification test: the decrease in the price of electricity has no e↵ect on the
materials share of revenue.
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2.4.3 Geography of the coal share of power
Using state-level geography as an instrument has the drawback that the instrument corre-
sponds to inland regions as opposed to the coasts. Figure 2.6 shows that the mountains
in the West and East Coast provide the altitude di↵erentials necessary for hydroelectric
power while the Great Plains need to use steam power.
Some variation persists within region, such as the neighboring states of North Dakota
with 100% coal power versus Minnesota with 36% coal power, or the neighboring states
of Florida with 98% coal power versus Georgia with 13% coal power. Nevertheless, the
within-region variation is not su cient to confirm the results of the labor share regressions:
Table 2.7 shows that the baseline results do not hold when including fixed e↵ects for the
nine US Census divisions.13
Hydroelectric power requires falling water and is close to the map of mountains in the
United States, a consequence of using geography as an instrument for the change in the
price of electricity depending on the source of power. If plants in the mountain regions are
a↵ected di↵erently during the Depression, it may invalidate the exclusion restriction of the
Instrumental Variable approach. One possibility is that mountain regions have government
programs for building dams.
Table 2.8 shows that the baseline results are robust to dropping counties within 50 miles
of dams under construction, giving confidence that the instrument is valid and the results
are not due to government demand for concrete products. The point estimates are similar
when dropping counties within 100 miles of dams under construction but the sample size
decreases to 439, which a↵ects the statistical significance of the estimates.
Appendix B.4 also shows that the change in the plant-level price of electricity is posi-
tively correlated with the change in the plant-level labor share of income, even including
13The nine Census divisions in the United States are New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central,





















































0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Coal share of power in 1927
Slope:  -0.09   t-statistic:  -0.32
R2:   0.00   Correlation:     -5%   Observations: 41
Figure 2.5: The coal share of power in 1927 is uncorrelated with the change in building
permits from 1929 to 1936.
Figure 2.6: Map of the share of coal power in 1927.
Note: a darker blue implies a higher coal share.
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Dependent variable:   log (wi,tLi,t/pi,tYi,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form




Constant -0.283* -0.335 -0.14
(0.157) (0.206) (0.166)
Division dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 733 733 733
R-squared 0.024 0.022 0.021
First-stage F -statistic 4.08
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.7: The e↵ect of electricity on the labor share of income is sensitive to including
dummies for the 5 divisions in the US.
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Dependent variable:   log (wi,tLi,t/pi,tYi,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form




Constant -0.178*** -0.349*** 0.0189
(0.0324) (0.122) (0.0486)
Observations 623 623 623
R-squared 0.007 0.009
First-stage F -statistic 17.52
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.8: The baseline results are robust to dropping counties within 50 miles of dams
under construction.
Details: The latitude and longitude by city is from Gaslamp Media (2014), which “compiled from a
city/county/state database and geocoded with Google Maps.” The list of counties with dam construction
is from Hay (1991) for dams completed between 1930 and 1940. The latitude and longitude of a county
with dam construction is the average of all cities in that county. The closest distance from county X to a
dam under construction is the minimum Haversine distance from all cities in county X to all counties with
dam construction.
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state fixed-e↵ects. These regressions are not identified but provide a within-state source of
variation that confirms the baseline results.
Another threat to identification occurs if the share of coal in electric power generation
reacts to changes in electricity demand and in aggregate demand. Appendix B.4 mitigates
these concerns and shows that the results are robust to using hydroelectric potential by
state as an instrument. Hydroelectric potential depends only on geography and does not
react to changes in electricity demand.
2.4.4 Electricity usage
This subsection shows the e↵ect of the change in the price of electricity on two measures
of electricity consumption: the number of electric motors per worker and the horsepower
of electric motors per worker. The IV regressions in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 trace the de-
mand curve and find a negative coe cient: cheaper electricity induces a higher number
of electric motors and with more horsepower. The theory predicts that the coe cients
on electric capital-labor ratios should be smaller than -1 and the regressions confirm that
prediction. The coe cients lack statistical significance possibly because of a smaller sam-
ple size: electricity variables are more rare than employment variables and even the labor
share regressions lose some statistical significance when considering the sample of plants
that report electricity variables in both years. For example, the e↵ect of the instrument
is statistically significant at the 1% level with all plants and statistically significant at the
10% level with the sample of plants reporting electricity variables.
The e↵ect on kilowatts per worker is imprecisely estimated and is omitted. This measure
may be problematic as it is absent for half the sample in 1935, was imputed with a linear
regression from the number and horsepower of electric motors, and has reduced variation.
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Dependent variable:   log (motorsi,t/Li,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form




Constant 0.408*** 0.769*** 0.290**
(0.0787) (0.260) (0.118)
Observations 555 555 555
R-squared 0.002 0.009
First-stage F -statistic 15.07
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.9: The e↵ect of the price of electricity on the number of electric motors per worker
conforms to the theoretical prediction.
Dependent variable:   log (horsepoweri,t/Li,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form




Constant 0.414*** 1.056*** 0.103
(0.107) (0.364) (0.111)
Observations 552 552 552
R-squared 0 0.027
First-stage F -statistic 15.07
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.10: The e↵ect of the price of electricity on the horsepower of electric motors per
worker conforms to the theoretical prediction.
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter tests the model of labor market changes based on capital-labor substitution in
the context of electricity and provides two contributions. First, it uses a plant-level dataset
from the concrete industry during the 1930s, digitized for the first time for this project.
Second, the identification strategy instruments shifts in the electricity supply curve with a
state’s initial loading on the coal technology. Consistent with the predictions of the model,
a decrease in the price of electricity caused a decrease in the labor share of income. This
result implies that the elasticity of substitution between electricity and labor is greater than
1. Some occupations may be more replaced by electrical machinery than others, such as the
routine, dexterity-intensive occupations described by Gray (2013). With this assumption
of substitutability between routine jobs and electricity, the model can also account for
other changes of the US labor market during the Great Depression: structural changes
in employment, a productivity speedup, job losses concentrated in recessions, and jobless
recoveries.
This chapter relates to the literature on waves of technology throughout history: “whole
eras of technical progress and growth appear to be driven by a few ’General Purpose Tech-
nologies,’ such as the steam engine, the electric motor, and semiconductors.” (Bresnahan
and Trajtenberg, 1995). A recent debate has focused on the importance of recent General
Purpose Technologies compared to previous ones. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) think
that “electricity and information technology [are] probably are the two most important
General Purpose Technologies so far.” Gordon (1999) disagrees and suggests that we may
face decreasing returns in the invention of new technologies: “electricity . . . was a much
more profound creator of productivity growth than anything that has happened recently . . .
this was a unique event that will not be replicated in the lifetimes of our generation or that
which follows us.” It is an open question whether the next General Purpose Technology
will be as important as previous ones and whether the historical patterns of the output and
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labor markets will repeat themselves.
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Chapter 3
Routinization and slow recoveries in
consumption
3.1 Introduction
Recent recoveries in the United States have not only been jobless—they have also been
slow. After the recessions of 1990, 2001, and 2007, the recovery of output from the NBER
trough to two years after is low by historical standards, at 9% after the 1980s as opposed
to 15% before. The slow recovery of output has been a puzzle for policymakers.1 Figure
3.1 displays this pattern of slow recoveries in output and real consumption expenditures
for nine postwar recessions.2 Consumption also has a slower recovery after the last three
recessions compared to previous ones. The dashed horizontal lines are 95% confidence
intervals: the average recovery of consumption and output is significantly di↵erent between
1See the speech of 20 November 2012 by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, who mentions the
“disappointingly slow pace of economic recovery in the United States.”
2I omitted the recoveries from the 1948 recession, from 1949 to 1951, which covered the beginning of
the Korean War and had an output increase of 18% due to government expenditures, and the recovery
from the 1980 recession, which was cut short by the 1981 recession.
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early and late recessions.
A simple counterfactual exercise illustrates the importance of consumption in explaining
the pattern of slow recoveries of output: what would be the recovery of output after the
last three recessions if consumption recovered at its pre-1990 speed? Figure 3.2 suggests
that the recovery of output would have been much stronger at 8.9% instead of 5.6%. The
slow recoveries of consumption accounts for 63% of recent slow recoveries of output.3 The
rest of this paper focuses on explaining the recent slow recoveries of consumption and leaves
the slow recoveries of output for future research.
This chapter bridges the gap between three strands of the literature, which have not
yet been documented in an integrated manner. The first strand concerns routinization
and jobless recoveries. The routinization hypothesis of Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003)
suggested that computers substitute for routine cognitive occupations, such as clerks and
salespeople, and complemented nonroutine cognitive occupations, such as managers and
engineers. The first chapter of this dissertation used that hypothesis and the continuous
decrease in the price of computers to propose a labor demand explanation for recent changes
in the US labor market, such as the shift away from routine occupations and the decline in
the labor share of income. Jaimovich and Siu (2012) also used the routinization hypothesis
to propose a labor supply explanation for jobless recoveries, when workers quit their routine
occupations during the recession and are not ready to take a nonroutine occupation in the
recovery. The reallocation from routine to nonroutine occupations can have di↵erent types
of cost, such as a cost by firms to hire workers in nonroutine occupations (the first chapter
of this dissertation) or a retraining period for workers to learn a new job (Jaimovich and
Siu, 2012).
3See also the report by the Congressional Budget O ce, “What accounts for the slow growth of the
economy after the Great Recession” of November 2012 for the importance of consumer spending in the
weakness of the recovery. See also Parker et al. (2011) for evidence on the e↵ect of the stimulus payments
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1953 1957 1960 1969 1973 1981 1990 2001 2007
Average of first 6 recoveries: 10.4%. Average of last 3 recoveries: 5.6%.
Figure 3.1: Output (top) and consumption (bottom) are slower to recover after recent
recessions.
Details: the recovery of quantity X from trough ⌧ is log (X
⌧+2/X⌧ ), between the NBER trough and two
years after. Source: Federal Reserve Economic Database. Output is Real GDP and consumption is “Real
Personal Consumption Expenditures” (PCECC96). The solid lines in the background are averages and the

























1953 1957 1960 1969 1973 1981 1990 2001 2007
Average of first 6 recoveries: 10.8%. Average of last 3 recoveries: 8.9%.
Figure 3.2: The recovery of output would be much stronger if consumption in the last three
recessions recovered at the same rate as after the previous 6 recessions.
Details: see text.
The second strand concerns slow recoveries. Gaĺı, Smets and Wouters (2012) docu-
mented the di↵erent speed of recovery after the recessions of 1990, 2001, and 2007 com-
pared to earlier ones. The speed of recovery of US GDP after recessions in the post-1990
era is twice slower than the pre-1990 era. Figure 3.1 confirms the findings of Gaĺı, Smets
and Wouters (2012) for output and extends them to consumption as well. Potential ex-
planations for the di↵erent speed of recovery are di↵erent shocks and financial frictions,
reviewed at the end of the introduction.
The third strand of the literature concerns hand-to-mouth consumption behavior and
zero savings. Deaton (1991) proposed an elegant explanation for the empirical regular-
ity that many households save too little. Borrowing constraints give an incentive to hold
precautionary savings: a binding borrowing constraint prevents consumption smoothing,
so optimizing agents should save more today to prevent the constraint from binding to-
morrow. Deaton explains why households save too little by the interaction of borrowing
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constraints, impatience in consumption, and autocorrelation in the income process.4 With
uncertainty, the impatient household has an incentive to hold precautionary savings but
these assets are costly because of foregone current consumption. The borrowing constraint
creates an asymmetry in consumption: the household can always save the windfall from a
large positive shock but may not be able to borrow to compensate a large negative shock.
Higher autocorrelation exacerbates this e↵ect: at the limit of a random walk, a permanent
decrease in income leads the household to run down its wealth, which may hit the borrow-
ing constraint. Impatient households with high autocorrelation in income and low initial
cash-on-hand can do no better than consume their income. Deaton calls this behavior
“simple Keynesian policy” and the subsequent literature refers to it as “hand-to-mouth.”5
Mankiw (2000) used this behavior to propose “the spenders-savers theory of fiscal policy.”
His model has two types of agents: “savers” are Ramsey agents save their income to smooth
consumption; “spenders” are hand-to-mouth agents consume their income. Hand-to-mouth
consumption behavior imply that temporary tax changes can a↵ect the demand for goods
and services. For example, in 1992, President Bush decreased the federal tax withheld from
workers’ paychecks without changing the amount owed at the end of the fiscal year. Shapiro
and Slemrod (1995) surveyed consumers and found that 43% of respondents would spend
most of the extra income.6 This behavior is incompatible with a model of a representative
household able to smooth consumption.
This chapter uses assumptions from these three strands of the literature and asks
4If households are su ciently patient, they have the incentive to save in order to increase consumption
in the future, in addition to the precautionary savings motive. Such households would save early in the
lifecycle and dissave later. Borrowing constraints are unlikely to bind for these households, which led the
author to focus on impatient households.
5Such hand-to-mouth behavior is one potential explanation for the excess sensitivity puzzle: consump-
tion responds to predictable changes in income. See Reis (2004) for a review of this literature and another
possible explanation with rational inattention.
6They asked respondents “How do you think you will use the extra $25 per month—do you think you
will spend most of it, save most of it, use most of it to repay debts, or what?”
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whether the routinization hypothesis and hand-to-mouth behavior of workers in routine
occupations can also explain recent slow recoveries in consumption. It assumes that work-
ers in routine occupations are di↵erent from nonroutine occupations in two respects. First,
workers in nonroutine occupations are always Ramsey optimizers with smooth consump-
tion whereas workers in routine occupations may be Ramsey optimizers or hand-to-mouth
agents (who consume all of their income). Second, employment in nonroutine occupations
may grow at the same rate as employment in routine occupations, which corresponds to
the US labor market dynamics before the 1980s, or it may grow at a faster rate, which
corresponds to the US labor market dynamics after the 1980s. Workers transitioning from
routine to nonroutine occupations need to go through a period of retraining, during which
they remain unemployed. Workers fired from routine occupations have a high job finding
rate before the 1980s and a low job finding rate after the 1980s.
The paper examines the behavior of consumption under four specifications, resulting
from turning these two di↵erences on and o↵. When workers in routine occupations are
hand-to-mouth consumers, recoveries of consumption are fast before the 1980s and slow
after the 1980s. Workers fired from routine jobs before the 1980s can easily find a new job,
so their consumption “bounces back” and recovers back to peak levels. The fast recovery of
consumption among routine occupations causes the growth rate of total consumption to be
higher than the growth rate of consumption among nonroutine occupations. Workers fired
from routine jobs after the 1980s have to go through a period of retraining, during which
they consume their unemployment benefits. If these benefits are constant, consumption of
workers in retraining is stagnant and the growth rate of total consumption is lower, leading
to a slow recovery.
When workers in routine occupations are Ramsey optimizers instead of hand-to-mouth
consumers, they are able to smooth consumption growth through job loss, before or after
the 1980s. Forward-looking and optimizing workers save to maintain consumption growth
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during the retraining period.
This chapter also uses the Survey of Consumer Finances to document that households
in routine occupations are more credit-constrained than households in nonroutine occupa-
tions, which supports the assumption of hand-to-mouth behavior. Future research could
micro-found the di↵erent behavior of workers in routine and nonroutine occupations with
di↵erent patience and access to credit markets by occupation. The assumption of hand-
to-mouth behavior is also consistent with Stephens (2014), who examines the Health and
Retirement Survey and finds that household food consumption “falls by roughly 16% upon
being displaced.” This result holds even if households anticipate their job displacement and
the subsequent fall in earnings. Consumption smoothing is incompatible with the e↵ects
of anticipated income shocks on consumption.
Related literature. Current explanations for slow recoveries consist of di↵erent shocks
or financial frictions. Gaĺı, Smets and Wouters (2012) conclude that recent slow recoveries
are due to unusually bad shocks. They estimate a new Keynesian, Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium model for the period 1966-2007. They find that risk premium shocks
and investment-specific technology shocks have changed in recent recoveries:
Demand shocks make a large positive contribution to the recoveries of the pre-
1990 period, but negative in the post-1990 one. The di↵erence between the
two is highly significant, both economically and statistically. This is in itself
more than su cient to explain the di↵erence in recovery growth rates across
subsample periods. Investment-specific technology shocks play the largest role
in accounting for that di↵erence.
They also estimate the model separately before and after 1984 and they find it “di cult
to conclude whether these parameter changes really represent structural changes in the
economy or whether they just reflect weak identification.” Future research could bridge
the gap between this chapter and Gaĺı, Smets and Wouters (2012) by re-estimating their
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DSGE model with a trend break in the markup shock. The wage markup in the model of
the first chapter of the dissertation has an increasing trend during the phase of technological
upgrading: it is the ratio of average labor productivity over the wage, so it equals the inverse
of the labor share of income, which the first chapter showed to have a decreasing trend.
Estimating such a model may explain the di↵erent behavior of shocks in the estimated
model of Gaĺı, Smets and Wouters (2012).
On the ability of financial frictions to explain slow recoveries, the literature has not
yet reached a consensus. On the one hand, Kannan (2012) correlates exposure to financial
frictions to sluggish recoveries from recessions at the sector-level. The dataset consists
of aggregate-level data from OECD countries to date business cycles and disaggregate-
level data for 28 manufacturing sectors that di↵er in their reliance on external finance,
both covering the period from 1970 to 2003. He finds that sectors relying more on external
finance—and more exposed to financial frictions—recover more slowly after recessions. This
result is robust to alternative definitions of exposure to financial frictions, such as having
fewer assets eligible as collateral or having smaller firms. The e↵ects of financial frictions
are strongest in the first year and die out after three years.
On the other hand, Bordo and Haubrich (2011) examine the 27 recessions and recoveries
in the United States since 1882 and find that financial crises are generally associated with
fast recoveries, though this relationship is not valid for all recessions. They mention that
“the evidence for a robust bounce-back is stronger for cycles with financial crises than those
without.” But three notable exceptions to this pattern are the recessions of 1929, 1990,
and 2007.
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3.2 A model of slow recoveries in consumption
Time is indexed as t = 1, 2, . . . . The economy has a continuum of workers indexed by
i 2 [0, 1]. These workers are identical except for their occupation: a fraction ⇡R have
routine occupations and 1   ⇡R have nonroutine occupations. For clarity, quantity X for
worker i is denoted XNR,i if worker i has a nonroutine occupation and XR,i if worker i has
a routine occupation.
The economy is a partial equilibrium model of the demand for consumption, conditional
on exogenous processes for employment, wages, and income. The path for these variables
could be derived as the result of an inelastic labor supply and a labor demand for both types
of occupations from firms, as in the first chapter. This chapter examines the behavior of
the economy when an aggregate and unexpected employment shock causes job loss among
routine and nonroutine occupations, depending on the labor market dynamics and the
behavior of consumption and savings.
3.2.1 Workers in nonroutine occupations





 t log (CNR,i,t) ,
subject to a budget constraint in each period:
CNR,i,t + ANR,i,t+1  YNR,i,t + (1 + r)ANR,i,t,
where ANR,i,t are the assets of the household at the beginning of period t. These assets
give the household principal plus interest at the beginning of period t.
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Workers in nonroutine occupations have a borrowing constraint:
ANR,i,t   0.
Workers in nonroutine occupations may be employed or unemployed at time t, with
LNR,i,t 2 {E,U}. Employment status is a Markov process with the probability of remaining
in employment state LNR,i,t being pNR,s = P (LNR,i,t+1 = s|LNR,i,t = s) for s 2 {E,U}.
Workers in nonroutine occupations obtain income YNR,E if employed and unemployment
insurance YNR,U if unemployed.
Households in nonroutine occupations have two state variables at time t: savings and
employment status. The Bellman formulation for the household employed in a nonroutine
occupation is




+   pE VNR,E (YNR,E + (1 + r)ANR,i,t   CNR,i,t)
+   (1   pE)VNR,U (YNR,U + (1 + r)ANR,i,t   CNR,i,t)
 
.
The Bellman formulation for the unemployed household looking for a nonroutine occupation
is similar, replacing the index E with U and vice-versa.
The Bellman formulation has a constraint:
YNR,i,t + (1 + r)ANR,i,t   CNR,i,t   0.
3.2.2 Workers in routine occupations
Workers in routine occupations can also be Ramsey agents, with the same equations as




Workers in routine occupations may be employed or unemployed at time t, with LR,i,t 2
{0, 1}. The probability of remaining employed in a routine occupation is denoted pR,E =
P (LR,i,t+1 = E|LR,i,t = E). In the specification before the 1980s, a worker laid o↵ from a
routine job can find a routine job right after with probability 1  pR,U . In the specification
after the 1980s, a worker laid o↵ from a routine job needs to spend ⌧ periods in retraining,
after which he finds a nonroutine job with the unconditional probability of being employed
in a nonroutine occupation:7
fNR,E = (1   pNR,U) / (2   pNR,E   pNR,U) .
After the transition period, the household that started in a routine occupation has
the same employment dynamics as those in nonroutine occupations. The household faces
uncertainty on the routine job, no uncertainty in unemployment, and uncertainty again on
the nonroutine job.
If workers in routine occupations are Ramsey agents, they follow an optimization prob-
lem that takes into account the reallocation into nonroutine occupations after ⌧ periods.
Workers in routine occupations have three state variables: employment status, savings,
and duration of unemployment if applicable. The Bellman formulation for the household
7The vector (f
NR,E
, 1   f
NR,E
) is also the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue 1 for the transition
matrix (p
NR,E
, 1   p
NR,U






employed in a routine occupation is




+   pR,E VR,E (YR,E + (1 + r)AR,i,t   CR,i,t)
+   (1   pR,E)VR,U (YR,U + (1 + r)AR,i,t   CR,i,t)
 
The Bellman formulation for a worker fired from a routine job and starting retraining
at period t is:8






+  ⌧ [fNR,EVNR,E (AR,i,t+⌧ ) + (1   fNR,E)VNR,U (AR,i,t+⌧ )]
)
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3.2.3 Impulse response functions
This section solves the model numerically and presents four impulse response functions to
an unexpected employment shock. The four specifications correspond to the assumptions
for workers in routine occupations—Ramsey agents or hand-to-mouth consumers—and for
labor market dynamics—before the 1980s with a high job finding rate or after the 1980s
with a low job finding rate.
The calibration of the model uses a discount factor   = 0.96 ⇡ 0.994 and an interest rate
8The model has perfect foresight during retraining so I define only the value function upon entering
retraining and not during retraining.
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r = 5%, so the growth rate of consumption with perfect foresight would be   (1 + r)  1 =
0.9%. The initial proportion of workers in routine occupations is ⇡R = 43% and the discount
of routine wages compared to nonroutine wages is 46%.9 Unemployment benefits are 50%
of previous income, wether routine or nonroutine income (Nickell, 1997, page 61). Initial
wealth of households is three times their current income if they are Ramsey optimizers. For
simplicity, the transition probabilities are the same for both workers: pNR,E = pR,E = pE
and pNR,U = pR,U = pU . The probability of remaining unemployed is pU = 0.2, the
estimate of Shimer (2008, Figure 1) from the Current Population Survey. The probability
of remaining employed is pE = 0.95, the estimate of von Wachter, Song and Manchester
(2007, Figure 1A) from Social Security Administrative Data. After the 1980s, a worker
laid o↵ from a routine job remains unemployed with probability 1 during retraining, which
lasts ⌧ = 2 periods.
The shock in period t = 5 is an unexpected job loss, which is four times higher than
usual with p̃E = 1   4 ⇥ (1   pE), and an unexpected job finding rate, which is zero with
p̃U = 1.
Figure 3.3 plots the impulse response functions to a negative employment shock before
the 1980s. The top panels show that employment in routine and nonroutine occupations
behaves similarly and recovers right after the shock. The middle left panel shows that
hand-to-mouth consumers decrease consumption upon impact and increase consumption
when returning to their jobs. The middle right panel shows that Ramsey workers in routine
occupations use their savings to smooth consumption during job loss. The bottom panels
plot the behavior of total consumption in logarithms. Consumption “bounces back” in the
recovery if workers in routine occupations are hand-to-mouth but is smooth if they are
Ramsey optimizers.
9Both numbers come from the Current Population Survey for March 2007 defining routine and nonrou-
















































































































0 5 10 15
Time
Figure 3.3: The model before the 1980s predicts a fast recovery of consumption if workers
in routine occupations are hand-to-mouth consumers and a smooth path of consumption if
they are Ramsey agents.
Details: Impulse response functions to a negative employment shock before the 1980s. Path of employment
by initial occupation (top), consumption by initial occupation (middle), and total consumption (bottom).
Workers in routine occupations as hand-to-mouth consumers (left) or Ramsey optimizers (right).
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Figure 3.4 plots the impulse response functions to a negative employment shock after the
1980s. The left panels consider workers in routine occupations as hand-to-mouth consumers
and the right panels consider workers in routine occupations as Ramsey optimizers. The
top panels plot the path of employment: this path is exogenous and is the same for hand-to-
mouth or Ramsey consumers. Employment of households who start in routine occupations
declines abruptly in period 5 and remains depressed for ⌧ = 2 periods of retraining. The
growth in employment of households initially in routine occupations between periods 5 and
6 comes from the trend of job loss before the shock, which is due to pR,E < 1.
The left middle panel plots the response of consumption for hand-to-mouth consumers:
they decrease consumption upon impact, maintain low consumption during retraining,
and increase consumption when finding the new job. The right middle panel plots the
response of consumption for Ramsey consumers: they are able to draw down on savings,
so consumption is smooth. The bottom panels plot the behavior of total consumption in
logarithms. With hand-to-mouth workers in routine occupations, consumption dips upon
impact and takes ⌧ periods to “bounce-back.” With Ramsey consumers, consumption
growth is smooth: it does not fall in the recession and does not increase much in the
recovery.
Table 3.1 summarizes the dynamics of consumption depending on the labor market
dynamics and on the consumption behavior for workers in routine occupations. The re-
covery of consumption after the recession is half as strong in late recessions compared to
earlier ones. Hand-to-mouth behavior is crucial for this result: with optimizing Ramsey
behavior, all households are able to smooth consumption, whose growth is higher for re-
cent recessions compared to previous ones. If households initially in routine occupations
optimize, the period of retraining is good news for workers in routine occupations: for a
low cost of ⌧ = 2 periods of retraining with half pay, they obtain permanently higher labor
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Figure 3.4: The model after the 1980s predicts a slow recovery of consumption if workers
in routine occupations are hand-to-mouth consumers and a smooth path of consumption if
they are Ramsey agents.
Details: Impulse response functions to a negative employment shock after the 1980s. Path of employment
by initial occupation (top), consumption by initial occupation (middle), and total consumption (bottom).
Workers in routine occupations as hand-to-mouth consumers (left) or Ramsey optimizers (right).
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Hand-to-mouth households Ramsey households
in routine occupations in routine occupations
Before 1980s dip and immediate recovery smooth
(no retraining) gC,recovery = 2.8% gC,recovery = 0.4%
After 1980s dip and delayed recovery smooth
(with retraining) gC,recovery = 1.5% gC,recovery = 0.7%
Table 3.1: Summary of consumption dynamics: if workers in routine occupations are hand-
to-mouth agents, consumption is slower to recover after the 1980s compared to before the
1980s.
occupations who become unemployed.
The mechanism in the model is simple. In early recessions, workers fired from routine
occupations find a job right after the recession. If workers in routine occupations are
hand-to-mouth, they consume their unemployment benefits or their labor income. The
increase of employment in routine occupations back to the unconditional distribution causes
a fast recovery of consumption after the recession. If workers in routine occupations are
optimizers, all households use their savings to smooth consumption—a smooth recovery.
In late recessions, workers switching from a routine to a nonroutine job have to go
through retraining. They have constant labor income and face no uncertainty during
unemployment. If these workers are hand-to-mouth consumers, they consume all their
unemployment benefits. Constant benefits imply constant consumption—a slow recovery:
CR,i,t = YR,U .
If these workers are optimizers, they follow the Euler equation with perfect foresight






=   (1 + r) .
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In summary, optimizing behavior for workers in routine occupations implies smooth
consumption growth around   (1 + r)   1, before or after the 1980s. Hand-to-mouth be-
havior implies fast consumption growth before the 1980s and slow consumption growth
after the 1980s.
3.3 Data on credit constraints and consumption be-
havior by occupation
This section presents support for the model by documenting the patterns of on credit con-
straints and hand-to-mouth behavior by occupation from the Survey of Consumer Finances.
It also tests one prediction of the model for durables and nondurables with aggregate-level
data.
The Federal Reserve Board sponsored the Survey of Consumer Finances every three
years since 1983. It reports financial variables and broad occupation categories from the
Census Bureau. In 1983 and from 1989 to 2010, the survey asks respondents about their
access to credit. From 1995 to 2010, the survey asks respondents about their consumption
behavior. The questions are:
1. “In the past five years, has a particular lender or creditor turned down any request
you (or your [husband/wife]) made for credit, or not given you as much credit as you
applied for?”
2. “Were you later able to obtain the full amount you (or your husband/wife) requested
by reapplying to the same institution or by applying elsewhere?”
3. “Was there any time in the past five years that you (or your [husband/wife]) thought
of applying for credit at a particular place, but changed your mind because you
thought you might be turned down?”
85
4. “Over the past year, would you say that (your/your family’s) spending exceeded
(your/your family’s) income, that it was about the same as your income, or that you
spent less than your income? (Spending should not include any investments you have
made.)”
Following Dogra and Gorbachev (2013), I define a household as liquidity constrained if an
application for credit was rejected, if it did not obtain the full amount, or if it was too
discouraged to apply (i.e., if it answers “yes” to question 1 and “no” to question 2, or if it
answers “yes” to question 3). I define a household as having hand-to-mouth behavior if it
answers “spending was about the same as income” to question 4.
The Survey of Consumer Finances also reports occupations by broad categories. Ace-
moglu and Autor (2011) mapped these broad categories into nonroutine jobs (“managerial
and professional specialty occupations”) and routine jobs (“technical, sales, and adminis-
trative support occupations”). The remaining categories are manual occupations, which
Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) showed to have limited scope for substitutability or com-
plementarity with computers: “service occupations and armed forces,” “precision produc-
tion, craft, and repair occupations,” “operators, fabricators, and laborers,” and “farming,
forestry, and fishing occupations.” Nonroutine jobs represent 44 million households in 2010
and routine jobs represent 22 million households, among 118 million households covered in
the survey (the remaining households have manual occupations).
The survey is a repeated cross-section with two sampling schemes: a standard sam-
ple from the 48 contiguous US states and a list sample designed to oversample wealthy
households. The survey provides sampling weights to correct for the sample design. The
aggregate-level figures in this chapter account for these sampling weights.
From 1989 onward, the Survey of Consumers Finances provides five “implicates” for
each household. If a variable is missing, each implicate provides a possibly di↵erent value
for the variable depending on the imputation method. If a variable is not missing, all
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Dependent variable Nonroutine Routine






Liquidity constraint 12% 21%
Hand-to-mouth behavior 23% 34%
Table 3.2: Households in routine occupations earn less, are more liquidity-constrained, and
are more likely to have hand-to-mouth behavior.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
implicates are the same. I average all implicates by household, except for the occupation
category, for which I choose the mode across the five implicates.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics by occupation for all years. The oversampling of
wealthy families implies larges values for annual income of routine and nonroutine occu-
pations. Routine occupations earn three times less than nonroutine, are more likely to be
liquidity-constrained, and more likely to spend their income.
Figure 3.5 aggregates across all respondents with their sampling weights. The top panel
shows that workers in routine occupations are more likely to be credit-constrained than in
nonroutine occupations, from 1983 to 2010. Two alternative measures of credit constraints
include credit cards and credit lines and produce similar results. The bottom panel shows
that workers in routine occupations are more likely to have hand-to-mouth behavior than
workers in nonroutine occupations, from 1995 to 2010.
Table 3.3 confirms these results with a regression analysis at the micro-level. Households
in routine occupations are more likely to be liquidity constrained and have hand-to-mouth
behavior, after controlling for income and demographic characteristics. The estimates are
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statistically significant at the 5% level. They imply that changing from a routine to a
nonroutine occupations makes a households 3 percentage points less likely to be liquidity
constrained and to have hand-to-mouth behavior.
Finally, one prediction of this theory that can be tested at the aggregate-level is that
the recovery of consumption is slower for durables than for non-durables. Browning and
Crossley (2009, page 1175) found that Canadian households respond to a temporary loss
of income by “cutting back dramatically on durables and leaving non-durables almost
untouched.” Figure 3.6 shows that this prediction holds: the recovery of durables purchase
is much weaker after the last three recession (4.5% versus 17%), as opposed to a strong
recovery in non-durables consumption.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter explains recent slow recoveries of consumption by assuming that workers in
routine occupations have hand-to-mouth consumption behavior. Before the 1980s, these
workers were fired in the recession and hired back in the recovery, so the drop in consump-
tion during the recession was followed by a bounce-back in the recovery. After the 1980s,
these workers are fired in the recession and need to spend some time in retraining to find a
new job, so the drop in consumption during the recession is not followed by a bounce-back
in the recovery. A simulation of the model suggests that the recovery of consumption is
half as strong after the 1980s compared to before the 1980s, a reduction that is similar to
that in the data of Figure 3.1.
The partial equilibrium model in this chapter endogeneizes consumption but output
is exogenous to the model. Future research could explain slow recoveries in output by
extending the model into a general equilibrium framework and considering the possibility
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Figure 3.5: Households in routine occupations are more liquidity constrained (top) and
more likely to have hand-to-mouth behavior (bottom) than those in nonroutine occupations.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
89
Dependent variable Liquidity constrained Hand-to-mouth
routine 0.180*** 0.120***
occupation (0.0429) (0.0367)

















Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.3: Households in routine occupations are more likely to be liquidity-constrained
and have hand-to-mouth behavior, compared to households in nonroutine occupations and
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Average of first 6 recoveries: 5.5%. Average of last 3 recoveries: 5.7%.
Figure 3.6: The recovery of durable consumption (top) is weaker than that of nondurable
consumption (bottom).
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Database, series PCND and PCDG, multiplied by the ratio of PCECC96
to PCEC.
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800 thousand workers have searched for jobs but dropped out of the labor force because
of discouragement.10 This discouragement would also reduce output in the long term. Yet
another extension to explain slow recoveries in output could include a multiplier e↵ect of
consumption on output and employment. The slow recovery of consumption would decrease
aggregate demand, production, job creation and labor income, which would further depress
consumption in a vicious circle.
10Federal Reserve Economic Database, series LNU05026646 and LNU05026647.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Equilibrium of the model
Denote ⌫C,t and ⌫NC,t the Lagrange multipliers of the capital accumulation constraints
(equations 1.2.2 and 1.2.3), and µt the multiplier of the budget constraint (equation 1.2.4).
Denote HNR,t and HR,t the hiring of nonroutine and routine jobs, with constraints:
LJ,t+1  LJ,t +HJ,t, HJ,t   0, J = NR,R. (A.1.1)
The first constraint implies that increases in employment have to come from hiring. The
second constraint implies that hiring is never negative. (If hiring could be negative, the firm
would receive subsidies for firing workers.) Denote  J,t the multiplier on the first constraint
and #J,t the multiplier on the second constraint. Denote ◆C,t and ◆NC,t the multipliers on
the positivity constraint for investment:
IC,t   0, INC,t   0.
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 1⌫NC,t 1   ⌫NC,t (1    NC)
µtrC,t = ✓
 1⌫C,t 1   ⌫C,t (1    C)
⌫NC,t = µt   ◆NC,t
⌫C,t = µt exp ( bt)   ◆C,t





The household’s program has four complementarity slackness conditions:
0 = INC,t◆NC,t,
0 = IC,t◆C,t,
0 = ⌫NC,t ((1    NC)KNC,t + INC,t   KNC,t+1) ,
0 = ⌫C,t ((1    C)KC,t + IC,t   KC,t+1) .





























⇢ 1 = wt +
D0,t 1
D0,t

























#NR,t = cNR    NR,t,
#R,t = cR    R,t,
where MPF is the marginal product of factor F . The firm makes zero intertemporal profits
but it may make positive or negative profits in each period, reverted to or financed by the
household.
The firm’s program has two complementarity slackness conditions:
#NR,tHNR,t =  NR,t (LNR,t +HNR,t   LNR,t+1) = 0,
#R,tHR,t =  R,t (LR,t +HR,t   LR,t+1) = 0.
The set of equilibrium conditions also includes the physical constraints of the model






For computational reasons, the numerical solution truncates the horizon at T < 1. An
equilibrium, solved by AMPL (A Mathematical Programming Language) is a set of 19⇥T
variables (consumption Ct, capital stocks KC,t and KNC,t, investments IC,t and INC,t, em-
ployment quantities Lt, LNR,t and LR,t, output Yt, rental rates rC,t and rNC,t, wages wt,
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Lagrange multipliers ⌫C,t, ⌫NC,t, µt,  NR,t, #NR,t, ◆C,t, ◆NC,t) solving 19⇥T equations (cap-
ital accumulation constraints (1.2.2-1.2.3), budget constraint (1.2.4), production function
(1.2.5), labor market equilibrium (1.2.7), six optimality conditions for the household, five
optimality conditions for the firm, and three complementarity slackness conditions).
The numerical solution replaces some of these equations with boundary conditions.
Eight equations are intertemporal and involve quantities at times t and t + 1: the two
capital accumulation constraints, the two labor accumulation constraints, the two first-
order conditions for the firm on labor, and the two first-order conditions for the household
on capital accumulation. The equilibrium has T   1 of these equations, with 8 equations
missing from the total set. These eight equations are replaced with boundary conditions
for the two types of capital and the two types of labor at time 1 and time T , equal to their
values in the initial or final steady-state. The steady-state is a set of time-independent
variables solving these equations when the outside variables (At, bt, Xt) or (bt, Xt, Yt) are
fixed at their level at time 1 or time T . To ensure that these boundary conditions play a
minimal role, the calibration includes a bu↵er of 20 time periods at the beginning and 60
time periods at the end, where the outside variables equal their initial or final values, e.g.
At = A1 for t  20 and bt = bT for t   T   60.
A.2 General proofs
Proof of Lemma 4. Given that this model has no market failures, the market equilibrium
















subject to the physical constraints in equations (1.2.3-1.2.2), (1.2.5-1.2.7), and to the fol-
lowing resource constraint (implied by the definition of profits, the budget constraint, and
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the labor market equilibrium):
Yt = Ct + INC,t + exp ( bt) IC,t + cNR (LNR,t+1   LNR,t)+ + cR (LR,t+1   LR,t)+ .
The Bellman formulation for the planner’s problem uses five state variables and seven
control variables:













+ ✓V (KNC,t+1, KC,t+1, LNR,t+1, LR,t+1, t+ 1)
)
,
subject to the same physical constraints.
The contraction mapping for a Bellman operator requires three Blackwell conditions.
First, the set of controls is bounded: hiring variables are bounded above by maximum labor
supply L̄ and quantity variables of consumption and investment are bounded by production
Yt, which is set by the four inputs as state variables. Both the disutility from labor supply
and the utility from consumption are bounded. The Bellman operator maps the space of
bounded functions into itself.
The remaining two conditions, monotonicity and discounting, follow from the Bellman
formulation of the problem with a discount parameter ✓. The contraction mapping theorem
guarantees existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the model Stokey and Lucas (see
1989, page 54).
In one numerical exercise, the hiring cost cR is zero and employment LR,t in routine
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occupations is no longer a state variable. The Bellman operator becomes:













+ ✓V (KNC,t+1, KC,t+1, LNR,t+1, t+ 1)
)
.
Labor variables are still bounded above by maximum labor supply L̄ and quantity











so the three Blackwell conditions still hold and the equilibrium exists.
Proof of Lemma 5. In the limiting balanced growth path, where the capital stocks
grow at constant rates, investment is positive and the Lagrange multipliers on investment
are zero:
◆NC,t = ◆C,t = 0.
The Lagrange multipliers on capital accumulation are linked to the marginal utility µt
from consumption:
⌫NC,t = µt,
⌫C,t = µt exp ( bt) .
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  1 +  NC ,









✓ 1 (1 + gµ)
 1   1 +  C
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! ✓ 1 (1 + gµ) 1 .
























The left-hand side of the factor price frontier diverges. The wage cannot converge to
zero, otherwise the right-hand side of the factor price frontier converges to zero. So the
wage is bounded away from zero. On the right-hand side, the two rental rates of capital





between 0 and {cNR, cR}, the wage is bounded away from zero, and the one-period discount
factor converges, so the terms ⌧J,t are bounded. All terms on the right-hand side converge
or are bounded, except for wages wt. Therefore, wages also diverge and grow indefinitely



































For a balanced growth path with constant employment, the growth in the disutility of
labor supply has to verify:
gX = gw = gA/ .
As wages grow indefinitely, the relative cost of computer capital decreases to zero and
employment reallocates entirely from routine to nonroutine jobs:
LNR,t ! L, LR,t ! 0.






which implies the following equation between limiting growth rates:
gY = gA + ↵gKNC +  gL +  gKI .
Using the constant capital-output ratios and the limiting growth rate of employment,
the growth rate of output is:
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gY = gA + ↵gY +  gY =
gA










  (1    J) ! gKJ +  J = gY +  J , J = C,NC.
Therefore, the investment-output ratios are also constant and the two types of invest-
ment grow at rate gY = gA/ . The resource constraint implies that consumption tends to
a constant share of output:
Ct
Yt

































Therefore, consumption grows at the same rate as output, and all quantities grow at
the same rate, as well as the wage:




To prove that the Lagrange multiplier µt declines at the same rate gA/ , note that the
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This share converges to  , since the multipliers  J,t are bounded, the one-period discount
factor converges, employment in nonroutine occupations is bounded, employment in routine
occupations tends to zero, and output diverges.
The marginal utility µt from consumption multiplied by consumption tends to a con-




















































A.3 Proofs in the special case of the model
Proof of Lemma 6. This proof omits the time index t. For the equilibrium condition, note
that the resource constraint on the product market and the household’s budget constraint
imply zero profits for the firm. Denoting ⇧j the indexed product operator (di↵erent from
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the logarithm ⇡ of labor productivity), consider a multifactor Cobb-Douglas production




j , with constant returns to scale
P
↵j = 1. Denote the marginal
































The marginal cost of the first two factors, KNC and LNR, is 1 and w. The marginal
cost of the third Cobb-Douglas factor, the Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution aggregate,
requires more detail. Consider a firm that is selling the third Cobb-Douglas factor at









⇢   rC KC   wLR.






















⇢ 1 L⇢ 1R = w.
Rearrange this expression, use  ⇢ =    1 and the solution for computer capital relative to
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This equation is the equilibrium condition for the wage, where the marginal cost of pro-
duction equals the marginal revenue. The left-hand side is strictly increasing in w, equals 0
for w = 0 and tends to infinity for w ! 1. Therefore, the wage that verifies the equation
is unique.























where the third equality uses the first-order conditions for the firm. At the limit bt !  1,
the wage tends to a lower bound w pinned down by the factor price frontier. At the limit
bt ! 1, the factor price frontier implies that the wage diverges. The limiting values of the




























To compute the impact of the change in the price of computers on the routine share of
employment, denote st = log (LR,t/Lt) the logarithm of the routine share of employment.
The elasticity of the routine share of employment, after accounting for the e↵ect of bt on
the wage, is negative:
@st
@bt






  + (  +  ) (ebtwt)
(1  )
⌘2 .
This elasticity is negative: cheaper computers decrease the routine share of employment.

























where the rental cost of computer capital is rC,t = exp ( bt) (see the proof of Proposition
9 for details).









  + (  +  ) (ebtwt)
1  
⌘2 (A.3.2)
At the limit bt !  1, the wage tends to a finite value w, which solves the factor




tends to infinity. Factoring that
term in the numerator and the denominator, the numerator tends to (  +  )   and the
denominator tends to infinity, so the fraction tends to 0. At the limit bt ! 1, the wage




tends to zero, so the derivative tends to
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 / .
The second derivative of labor productivity ⇡t with respect to bt is:
@2⇡t
@b2t

























For   2 (1, 2], all the terms in this expression are strictly positive. For   > 2, all the
terms are positive, except the second line, which changes signs at b⇤ verifying:
b⇤ + logw (b⇤) =
1










The left-hand side, as a function of bt, is strictly increasing and has limits at ±1 for
bt ! ±1, so the equation has one and only one solution b⇤.
































The cost rC,t of computer capital decreases with time, while the wage wt increases with
time, so the labor share of income unambiguously decreases with time.
At the limit bt !  1, the rental rate rC,t of computers becomes arbitrarily large while
the wage converges to w, so the labor share of income tends to  + . At the limit bt ! 1,
the rental rate rC,t of computers becomes arbitrarily small, the wage becomes arbitrarily
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large, so the labor share of income tends to  .
Proof of Corollary 10. Take the limit   ! 1 in the expressions for the last three
proofs.
Proof of Proposition 11. Denote log-employment with l (t), log-output with y (t),
and the logarithm of labor productivity with ⇡ (t):
y (t) = ⇡ (t) + l (t) .
A linear approximation of employment growth around its trough tl yields:
l̇ (t) = l̇ (tl)|{z}
=0
+(t   tl) l̈ (tl) + o (t   tl) .
Write output growth as productivity growth plus employment growth and use the linear
approximation:
ẏ (t) = ⇡̇ (t) + l̇ (t) = ⇡̇ (t) + l̈ (tl) (t   tl) + o (t   tl) .
The trough ty of output verifies:
ẏ (ty) = 0 = ⇡̇ (ty) + l̈ (tl) (ty   tl) + o (ty   tl) , tl   ty =
⇡̇ (ty)
l̈ (tl)
+ o (tl   ty) .





The wage depends only on the trend of TFP and of the price of computer investment.
The trend component of Xt o↵sets the wage, so employment depends on the cyclical com-
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ponent x̃t of the labor supply shifter:
Lt / exp (" x̃t) .
Since x̃t is periodic with a single trough, l̈ (tl) is also periodic and has the same value
at all troughs, denoted l̈trough. Since labor has a trough, l̈trough > 0. To a first-order
approximation, the length of the jobless recovery is proportional to productivity growth ⇡̇:




The meaning of the first-order approximation is that ty   tl be small compared to the
period of the business cycle in Xt. In economic terms, it assumes that the length of the
jobless recovery is a fraction of the length of the business cycle (for example, the duration
peak-to-peak). Mathematically, the Taylor series expansion of employment growth with
the Lagrange form of the remainder is:
l̇ (ty) = (ty   tl) l̈ (tl) +
1
2
(ty   tl)2 l̈ (t0) , t0 2 (ty, tl) .
If ty   tl is small, i.e. if l̈ (t0) is changes little in the interval (ty, tl) compared to its vari-
ations over the business cycle, then l̈ (t0) is close to l̈ (tl) and the first-order approximation
is valid. Figure A.1 contains a graphical version of this interpretation.
A.4 More details on the model and the data
The model predicts that the decline in the labor share of income is entirely due to rou-
tine occupations. Figure A.2 shows the labor share of income for routine and nonroutine























Figure A.1: The first-order approximation of the length of jobless recoveries is valid if
jobless recoveries are short compared to the length of the business cycle.
Figure A.3 shows the path of the labor share in the data and in the model fitting US
data. In the data, the labor share decreased 7.5% between the trough of the 1981 recession
and the trough of the 2007 recession. The magnitude is similar in the model.
Figure A.4 shows the path of routine jobs in the model and in the data. The model has
a good fit after 2000.
Figure A.5 shows the acceleration of the share of computers in fixed investment in the
data and in the model. In the data, this share increased 8 percentage points between 1960
and 1980 and 21 percentage points from 1980 to 2000.
This paper explains the acceleration of routinization during recessions and jobless re-
coveries with computers. Yet, it predicts that computer investment is procyclical instead
of accelerating in recessions. The absence of adjustment costs to capital leaves computer
investment free to adjust: it falls in recessions and increases in recoveries. Figure A.6 shows
the behavior of computer investment in the data and in the model. The model matches the
behavior of computer investment: after a recession, computer investment simply catches
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Figure A.2: The decline in the labor share of income is entirely due to routine occupations.
Source: Current Population Survey, Occupational Information Network, and Federal Reserve Economic
Database. Routine occupations are quartiles 3 and 4, nonroutine occupations are quartiles 1 and 2. The
labor share of income for routine occupations is the labor income of routine occupations as a share of total
labor income (held constant across the threshold years of 1982, 1992, and 2002), multiplied by the labor
share of the nonfarm business sector (series PRS85006173).
A final prediction is that the investment share of output is procyclical and decreases
in recessions, for two reasons. First, the absence of adjustment costs to capital implies
that it is free to adjust to the recession. Second, the household has an incentive to smooth
consumption but no incentive to smooth investment, so the burden of adjustment to a
recession falls on investment. The calibration of the model also matches the cyclicality of
the investment share of output, as shown in Figure A.7.
A.5 Extension of the model with nominal rigidities
This section extends the model with nominal rigidities and shows that the mechanism of
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Figure A.3: The model matches the path of the labor share of income in the data.
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Database, with labor share of the nonfarm business sector. Shaded
areas are NBER recessions.
The model is the same as the baseline model, with a change on the utility function for
the household and the labor market clearing. The household has a labor supply curve fixed




Labor demand is bounded above by labor supply:
LNR,t + LR,t  LS.
The wage is downward rigid:
wt+1   wt.
The first-order condition on labor supply for the household (equation XtL
1
"
t = wt) is
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Figure A.4: The model matches the decline in employment of routine occupations in the
data since 2000.
Source: Current Population Survey, Occupational Information Network, and model simulations. See text
for details. Shaded areas are NBER recessions.
and one of them holds with equality:
 
LS   LNR,t   LR,t
 
(wt+1   wt) = 0.
The calibration of the model based on the path of US output follows the same procedure
as the main text. Figure A.8 shows the result for the path of employment. Even with
nominal rigidities, the hiring cost gives an incentive for the firm to hoard nonroutine jobs
during the recession and to shift the burden of adjustment onto routine jobs. Recent
recessions accelerate the structural decline of routine jobs.
A.6 More evidence on categories of employment
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Figure A.5: The model and the data have an acceleration of the share of computers in fixed
investment in recent decades.
Data: investment in computers, peripheral equipment, and software, divided by nonresidential fixed invest-
ment in equipment (BEA series B935RC0, B985RC0, and B010RC0, from Table 5.5.5U, “Private Fixed
Investment in Equipment and Software by Type”). The series in the model and in the data are in nominal
terms.
routine/nonroutine and manual/cognitive tasks, correspond broadly to the following occu-
pation categories: “professional, managerial and technical occupations are specialized in
nonroutine cognitive tasks (NR C); clerical and sales occupations are specialized in rou-
tine cognitive tasks (R C); production and operative occupations are specialized in routine
manual tasks (R M); and service occupations are specialized in non- routine manual tasks
(NR M).”
This categorization is sometimes coarse: accountants and auditors are classified as non-
routine cognitive according to Acemoglu and Autor but they are in Quartile 1 according
to the measure of routinization in this paper. Nevertheless, the patterns of employment
using the Acemoglu-Autor classification are similar to those with the routinization index:
employment in routine occupations has a long-term decrease that accelerates during re-
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Figure A.6: After recessions, computer investment returns to trend, both in the data and
in the model.
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Figure A.7: The investment share of output is procyclical, both in the data and in the
model.
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Database, Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment divided by Gross
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Figure A.8: The mechanism of nonroutine hoarding is robust to the possibility of wage
rigidities.



































































































































































































































































































Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Census of Manufactures for the concrete industry
B.1.1 Matching across years
I matched plants between years 1929 and 1935 according to a similar procedure as Bresna-
han and Ra↵ (1991). Some plants sent two schedules to the Census Bureau; I aggregated
them into a new plant by either averaging their responses if the two schedules cover the
same period of operation, or by summing their results if they cover di↵erent periods. I
considered that two plants were a match if:
1. one plant is from 1929 and the other from 1935
2. the two plants are located in the same state, county, and city
3. one of the following conditions hold:
(a) two of the identifying fields coincide (name of plant, address, name of owner,
street address, post o ce address),
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(b) the plant in 1935 changed name, owner, or location, and conditions (a) hold
between the change details in 1935 and the name, owner, or location in 1929,
4. no other plants match criteria (1-3).
As an example of condition 2, I considered small cities included in larger cities to be the
same, such as Flushing and New York. I also considered nearby cities to be the same,
such as Edina and Minneapolis, since concrete plants sometimes reported the location of
the plant and sometimes the post o ce address of the general o ce. As an example of
condition 3 (a), it is verified between a plant in 1935 with name “Gehirs” and address “23
Conklin St,” and a plant in 1929 with owner “Gehirs” and address “Conklin street and
Liberty Avenue.” As an example of condition 3 (b), it is verified between a plant in 1935
with a name change from “Concrete pipe company” to “Concrete products, Inc.” and a
plant in 1929 with name “Concrete pipe company.” As an example of condition 4, if two
plants in Rockford, Illinois, share the name “Rockford plant” in 1929, then none is matched
to the “Rockford plant” in 1935.
This procedure produces 742 plants merged between 1929 and 1935, of which 733 have
information on the labor share of revenue in both years. Out of the 2,435 concrete plants
operating in 1929, more than two thirds exited the market; out of the 1,108 concrete plants
operating in 1935, a third entered the market.
The schedules changed slightly across plants. Some concrete plants in 1929 filled a
schedule for the Census of Mines and Quarries, which omitted questions about electricity
consumption and the quantity of output. Some plants filled other schedules and reported
their output in di↵erent units, e.g. the number of laundry trays instead of their weight.
127
B.1.2 Data for the Census of Manufactures in other years
The schedules before 1929 and after 1935 were lost. The Census Bureau used them to
compile information for the Statistical Abstracts and publications of the manufacturing
industry. After such compilation, an Act of Congress gave the right to destroy the sched-
ules. A 1971 letter by Dennis Rousey, Acting Chief of the Industrial and Social Branch,
mentioned that “Since 1900, the schedules of agriculture censuses have been disposed of
under Congressional authorization,” with the manufacturing schedules possibly having a
similar fate. An archivist told me that he was surprised that the schedules for 1929 to 1935
even survived, which he attributed to the relevance of the economic downturn. I searched
for earlier or later schedules extensively and found only one surviving schedule from 1925,
for the Crow Indian Mill in Colorado and kept at the National Archives in Denver, and one
surviving schedule from 1939, for a German-owned company and the German American
Bund that was seized during World War II. The schedules for the 1947 Census of Manu-
factures were transferred to non-safety microfilm, are disintegrating, and are “unavailable
to researchers [because of] preservation issues and concerns.”1
B.1.3 Categories of employment
The Census asked about two categories of employment, wage-earners and salaried workers,
described in detail below. Wage-earners are present in all years and represent around 90% of
employment. O cers of the corporation were sometimes reported on a special administra-
tive schedule that is absent from the Census of Manufactures. In 1929, the Census included
engineers and other technical employees as wage-earners. In 1935, technical employees had
a separate category. This chapter considers all categories of employment, excluding pro-
prietors, who had no salary, and salaried o cers of the corporation, who were sometimes
1Electronic correspondence with the National Archives at College Park, Maryland.
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reported on a di↵erent form. The details of employment categories suggest that the two
types of employment are di↵erent from skilled/unskilled and from routine/nonroutine oc-
cupations.
• Categories of employment in 1929:
– Proprietor or firm members
– Principal o cers of corporations
– “Managers, superintendents, and other responsible administrative employees;
foremen and overseers who devote all or the greater part of their time to super-
visory duties; clerks, stenographers, bookkeepers, and other clerical employees
on salary.”
– Wage-earners: “Skilled and unskilled workers of all classes, including engineers,
firemen, watchmen, packers; also foremen and overseers in minor positions who
perform work similar to that done by the employees under their supervision.”
• Categories of employment in 1935:
– Proprietor or firm members
– Salaried o cers of the corporation
– Supervisory employees: “managers, superintendents, and other responsible ad-
ministrative employees (including plant foremen whose duties are primarily su-
pervisory but not including foremen and overseers in minor positions who per-
form work similar to that of the employees under their supervision”
– Technical employees: “trained technicians, such as chemists, electrical and me-
chanical engineers, designers, who hold responsible positions requiring technical
training and whose supervisory duties, if any, are only incidental”
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– Clerical employees: “clerks, stenographers, bookkeepers, timekeepers, and other
clerical employees (including laboratory assistants, draftsmen), whether in the
o ce or in the factory”
– Wage-earners: “all time and piece workers employed in the plant (including
the power plant and the maintenance, shipping, warehousing, and other depart-
ments) covered by this report, not including employees reported above. Include
here working foremen and gang and straw bosses, but nor foremen whose duties
are primarily supervisory.”
B.1.4 Measurement of plant-level variables and industry back-
ground
The histograms in Figure B.1 suggest that the labor share of income have bell-shaped
frequency curves with accurate measurement. The Census Bureau checked thoroughly these
variables and mailed the plant for more information when it found outliers. In contrast,
Figure B.2 suggests that the average price of electricity has considerable variation, up to
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Figure B.2: The average price of electricity of concrete plants in 1929 and 1935 has a
fat-tailed distribution.
This chapter considers the income pi,tYi,t to be revenue instead of value added. Revenue
is a more robust measure and contains fewer outliers: for example, some plants during the
Depression were operating at a loss and had negative value added (see Berman, Bound and
Griliches (1994, page 383) for a similar approach).
Around half of concrete plants omitted kilowatts in 1935 but they did report the number
and horsepower of electric motors. I imputed that quantity using a linear regression of
kilowatts on number and horsepower, all in logarithms, and using the linear prediction for
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the missing quantities. I did a similar procedure for the 29 plants that omitted kilowatts
in 1929.
Tennessee Valley Authority (1947) details the production of concrete for the Tennessee
Valley Authority projects. It consists of mixing cement (often portland cement) with
water and an aggregate (crushed stone, sand, or gravel). Production of concrete starts
with collecting the aggregate, for example the sand of a river or the stone from a quarry.
Plants convey the aggregate to their location and may need to crush the stone to obtain a
finer aggregate. Plants mix the ingredients—cement, the aggregate, and water—to obtain
a fluid substance that they pour onto a mold. The substance hardens with time. Plants
sometime vibrate the mold to achieve more compactness between the aggregate and cement.
They cure the concrete product with water, as cement requires a moist environment to
harden further and increase strength. Plants may also polish the concrete product with
sandblasting—a jet of water mixed with sand under high pressure to remove superficial
irregularities. If plants convey the concrete product over a long distance to the delivery
location, the product bears the risk of un-mixing.
B.2 Electricity data and background
B.2.1 Other measures of the price of electricity
Other measures of the price of electricity exist during this period but they are inferior
to the state-level price of electricity used in the baseline regressions. First, the price of
electricity paid by ice plants (Ziebarth, 2011) covers cities that coincide with only 200
concrete plants. Second, the city-level price of electricity for residential consumers for a
typical bill of 25, 100, or 250 kilowatt-hours (Federal Power Commission, 1937) is a survey
with measurement error due to retrospective questions asked in 1936, concerns residential
consumers instead of industrial consumers, and has a significantly lower amount than the
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average demand by concrete plants in 1929 (1400 kilowatt-hours per month for concrete
plants versus 250 kilowatt-hours for residential consumers). Third, the price of electricity
by municipal utilities from the Census of Electric Light and Power Stations in 1927 and
1937 concerns a small market (5% of total kilowatt-hours).2 Fourth, the Census of Electric
Light and Power Stations published the price of electricity from both public and private
utilities to industrial consumers, split by “small” (retail) and “large” (wholesale), but the
“wholesale” numbers exist only half of the states to prevent disclosure of establishment
information. To the best of my knowledge, there are no other measures for the price of
electricity that are disaggregated geographically over this period.
Figure B.3 shows a scatter plot of the change in the state-level price of electricity and a
Paasche index of the change in the price of electricity at the plant-level aggregated at the
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Change in state-level price of electricity, 27-37
Slope:  -2.38   t-statistic:  -2.26
R2:   0.14   Correlation:    -38%   Observations: 33
Figure B.3: The change in the Paasche index of the price of electricity is negatively related
to the change in the state-level price of electricity.
2Census of Electric Light and Power Stations, 1927, page 71.
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B.2.2 Pricing of electricity
Electric utilities o↵ered several rate schedules. The Federal Power Commission published a
glossary of terms and a summary of these rate schedules in 1936. All rates have a component
of capacity, in kilowatts or horsepower, and of energy, in kilowatt-hours or Joules.
An electric bill consists of three types of charges: a customer charge, a demand charge,
and an energy charge. The Federal Power Commission defines “customer charge” or “ser-
vice charge” as “a component part of a rate schedule providing that a customer must pay
a certain definite sum in a specified period (usually 1 month) without regard to the con-
sumption of energy or the demand, for which he can use no energy or demand.” It defines
a “demand charge” as “a component part of a rate schedule which provides for a charge
based upon the customer’s demand or equivalent, without regard to the consumption of
energy.” It defines “energy charge” as “a component part of a rate schedule that provides
for a charge based upon the amount of energy consumed.” In short, the customer pays the
demand charge for the right to use a given capacity from the grid, and it pays an energy
charge for consumption of electricity.
Most rate schedules also define “maximum demand,” which is often the aggregate ca-
pacity of electric appliances commonly used. For example, a plant may have a primary
motor and a stand-by motor, each with a capacity of 100 kW. The plant may normally
use only the primary motor and contracts for a maximum demand of 100 kW. If the plant
happens to use both motors at the same time, it will have to pay a higher price for using
more capacity than the maximum demand.
The flat rate schedule “provides for a specified charge per unit of time, irrespective of
the amount of electric energy taken. For example: $2 per month per customer up to and
including 6-50 watt lamps.”
The straight line meter rate schedule “provides for a constant charge per unit of energy
regardless of the amount consumed. For example: 5 cents per kilowatt-hour.”
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The flat demand rate schedule “bases the billing either on the demand or on some fixed
characteristic indicative of demand but provides no charge for energy. For example: $50.00
per year per horsepower of demand.”
The flat and meter rate schedule is a two-part tari↵ with “two components, the first of
which is a customer (or service) charge and the second of which is a price for the energy
consumed.”
The block meter rate schedule “divides the total amount of energy to be consumed
during a definite period into prescribed blocks and provides a di↵erent rate for each.”
The Hopkinson demand rate schedule has “two components, the first of which is a
charge for demand, and the second a charge for the energy consumed.”
The block Hopkinson demand rate schedule has “either the demand charge or the energy
charge or both are arranged in blocks. For example, a demand charge of $1.25 for the first 50
kilowatts of maximum demand per month, and $1.00 per kilowatt for all above 50 kilowatts
of maximum demand per month. Plus: an energy charge of 3 cents per kilowatt-hour for
the first 1,000 kilowatt-hours used per month, and 1 cent per kilowatt-hour for all energy
used in excess of 1,000 kilowatt-hours per month.”
The step meter rate schedule has “a charge per unit of energy [that] is constant for all
kilowatt-hours consumed during the billing period, the charge per unit depending upon the
total consumption. For example: if 1 to 25 kilowatt-hours are used in a month, 5 cents per
kilowatt-hour; if 26 to 50 kilowatt-hours are used in a month, 3 cents per kilowatt-hour
(for all the energy including the first 25 kilowatt-hours).”
The three-part rate schedule “provides three components for determining the total bill:
customer charge, demand charge, and energy charge. For example: 50 cents per month per
meter. Plus: a demand charge of $1.25 per month per kilowatt for the first 25 kilowatts
of maximum demand in the month; 90 cents per month per kilowatt for the excess of the
maximum demand over 25 kilowatts. Plus: an energy charge of 1.5 cents per kilowatt-hour.”
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Furthermore, rate schedules may have clauses providing for additional charges in the
event of large increases in the price of coal, the price of commodities, or wages.
B.2.3 Technical progress in the generation of electricity
Figure B.4 illustrates the exponential decrease in the price of electricity over the first half
of the 20th century. Gordon (1992, Table 1) estimates the rate of decrease in the price of
electricity at 7% per year between 1899 and 1948. The price of electricity increased during
the Great Depression because of deflation in the consumer price index. In a more general
model with irreversible investment, firms would have di culty adjusting their capital stock
to cyclical changes in the price of electricity and would react to the trend in the price of
electricity rather than to the fluctuations. Furthermore, the nominal price of electricity
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Figure B.4: The real price of electricity decreased exponentially in the first half of the 20th
century.
The price of electricity is in cents per kilowatt-hour from the Historical Statistics of the United States,
series Db234, Db235, and Db237. The price deflator is the consumer price index from the BLS, series Cc1.
The rate of decrease of the price of electricity for residential consumers is 5.8%.
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The technology to produce electricity from coal improved over the first half of the 20th
century. The most common fuel was bituminous coal: “representing 77.1 percent of the
total consumed, while natural gas is second in importance, reporting 12.4 percent of the
total” (Census of Electric Light and Power Stations, 1937, page 5).
The technical progress benefitted the coal technology but not the hydroelectric technol-
ogy:
In generating electricity from coal even the largest and most modern electric
power stations are able to utilize only about 25 per cent of the heat units
available in the coal. ... On the other hand, modern hydro-electric machinery
now transforms into electricity more than 90 per cent of the energy in falling
waters, leaving little opportunity for radical improvements in present-day hydro-
electric practice. (The electric light and power industry, 1931, page 43)
Hughes (1993) also describes the economies of scale of electrification in Western Society
over the period 1880-1930.
B.3 Proofs
















⇢   wt (LNR,t + LR,t)   rNE,tKNE,t   rE,tKE,t
⌘
,
where ⇢ = (    1) / . The firm has no accumulation constraints on capital or labor and
the intertemporal maximization problem collapses to a sequence of static maximization
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whereMPF is the marginal product of factor F . The ratio of electric capital to employment























































































































Table B.1 shows the baseline regressions including the change in the state-level price of
cement as a proxy for the price of intermediate inputs. The price of cement was digitized
by Ziebarth (2011), who kindly provided me with an electronic version of the dataset.
The price of cement is irrelevant for the change in the labor share of income and the
electricity coe cient is stable around 1 in OLS and 2 in IV, although it loses statistical
significance in Instrumental Variables. The coe cient is statistically significant in reduced
form. If intermediate inputs enter the production function in Cobb-Douglas form, the
theory predicts that their price is summarized by the price of output pi,t. The price of
intermediate inputs should be absent from the expression for the labor share of income in
the same way that the rental rate of non-electric capital was absent from the expression
for the labor share of income in equation (2.3.2).
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Dependent variable:   log (wi,tLi,t/pi,tYi,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form
  log (pE,k,t/wk,t) 0.780** 2.491*
(state-level) (0.333) (1.467)
  log pcement,k,t -0.0195 0.188 0.0063
(state-level) (0.217) (0.328) (0.184)
coalk,1927 -0.174**
(state-level) (0.0681)
Constant -0.186*** -0.371** 0.0196
(0.0353) (0.154) (0.0571)
Observations 680 680 680
R-squared 0.01 0.01
First-stage F -statistic 6.245
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.1: The baseline results are robust to including the price of cement.
Table B.2 presents the results for labor productivity (with quantities). The coe cients
have the expected sign: the decrease in the price of electricity caused an increase in la-
bor productivity, consistent with the prediction of the model. The standard error of this
coe cient is large because output quantities are measured with error.
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Dependent variable:   log (Yi,t/Li,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form




Constant -0.218*** 0.0106 -0.401***
(0.0776) (0.175) (0.0920)
Observations 503 503 503
R-squared 0.001 0.005
First-stage F -statistic 14.83
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.2: The e↵ect of the price of electricity on labor productivity conforms to the
theoretical prediction.
Tables 2.6 shows a falsification test with the fuel share of revenue, similar to the falsifi-
cation test with the materials share of income in Table 2.6. Table B.3 suggests that initial
coal dependence has an e↵ect on the change in the fuel share of revenue that is significant
at the 10% level. It is possible that states that were initially more dependent on coal power
may also have better access to bituminous coal, the main fuel used by the concrete industry.
Table B.4 shows that the baseline results for electricity are unchanged when including the
change in the fuel share of revenue as a control variable, allaying the concerns about the
importance of the fuel share as a competing channel for the e↵ect of electricity on the labor
share of income.
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Dependent variable:   (Fueli,t/pi,tYi,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form




Constant -7.83E-05 0.0025 -0.000649
(0.000831) (0.00203) (0.000533)
Observations 742 742 742
R-squared 0.001 0.001
First-stage F -statistic 14.89
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.3: Falsification test: the decrease in the price of electricity has no e↵ect on the
fuel share of revenue.
As the fuel share of revenue is small, around 1%, this regression uses the percentage point change instead
of the log-change.
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Dependent variable:   log (wi,tLi,t/pi,tYi,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form
  log (pE,k,t/wk,t) 0.689** 2.164**
(state-level) (0.281) (0.854)
 FUELi,t/pi,tYi,t 3.093 2.959 3.449
(plant-level) (2.018) (2.048) (2.079)
coalk,1927 -0.188***
(state-level) (0.0587)
Constant -0.185*** -0.345*** 0.0193
(0.0325) (0.0939) (0.0438)
Observations 733 733 733
R-squared 0.012 0.016
First-stage F -statistic 7.405
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.4: The baseline results are robust to including the change in the fuel share of
revenue as a control variable.
Table B.5 shows the results of the baseline regressions using an alternative instrument:
the hydroelectric potential estimated by Douglas et al. (2006, Table 7, page 26). The
first-stage F -statistic is smaller than the coal share instrument. Nevertheless, the point
estimates for the electricity regressor are similar. The results for electricity usage are
similar to the results in the text, with lower statistical significance, and are omitted.
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Dependent variable:   log (wi,tLi,t/pi,tYi,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form




Constant -0.184*** -0.239*** -0.372***
(0.0326) (0.0695) (0.126)
Observations 733 730 730
R-squared 0.008 0.005 0.009
First-stage F -statistic 6.486
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.5: The baseline results are robust to using hydroelectric potential as an alternative
instrument.
Table B.6 shows the plant-level correlations between the plant-level change in the la-
bor share of income and the plant-level change in the price of electricity, with several
specifications. The coe cient on the plant-level price of electricity is stable around 0.07,
statistically, and economically significant. A 1% decrease in the price of electricity is associ-
ated with a 0.07% decrease in the labor share of income. The regression coe cient has the
same order of magnitude as the simulations of the model. The first two columns use only
the plant-level price of electricity, with and without dummies for each state. The next two
columns include the change in the plant-level wage. The coe cient on plant-level wages
is positive, in contrast to the model’s prediction of a negative. This specification may be
problematic since the change in the plant-level wage could also be an outcome variable and
may be correlated with the error term, leading to a biased estimate. The last column shows
a regression using the change in the average wage at the state-level for all manufacturing
plants between 1929 and 1935. This proxy for the wage in all of manufacturing is less
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likely to be an outcome variable of the price of electricity paid by concrete plants. The
wage coe cient is then negative, economically significant, and statistically significant at
the 10% level. These regressions contain endogeneity bias but they provide a source of
variation that is orthogonal to the state-level variation in the baseline regressions.
Dependent variable:   log (wi,tLi,t/pi,tYi,t)
  log pE,i,t 0.0608** 0.0813** 0.0598** 0.0741** 0.0638**
(plant-level) (0.0300) (0.0318) (0.0281) (0.0300) (0.0300)




Constant -0.0345 0.111 0.161*** 0.269 -0.367*
(0.0298) (0.539) (0.0394) (0.510) (0.194)
State dummies No Yes No Yes No
Observations 337 337 337 337 337
R-squared 0.012 0.131 0.139 0.229 0.021
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.6: The decrease in the price of electricity at the plant-level is correlated with a
decrease in the labor share of revenue.
Table B.7 shows that the coe cients are stable when using the labor share of value
added instead of income (value added is income minus the cost of materials, fuel, and
electricity).
145
Dependent variable:   log (wi,tLi,t/V alueAddedi,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form




Constant -0.155*** -0.293*** 0.0291
(0.0351) (0.0932) (0.0451)
Observations 732 732 732
R-squared 0.006 0.007
First-stage F -statistic 14.89
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.7: The baseline results are robust to using the labor share of value added instead
of revenue.
Tables B.8 and B.9 show the baseline regressions using state-level controls of GDP in
1929 and the share of population working in agriculture in 1920. The electricity coe cient
is also stable between 1 and 2.
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Dependent variable:   log (wi,tLi,t/pi,tYi,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form
  log pE,k,t 1.087*** 1.678***
(state-level) (0.266) (0.517)
share of farm in 1920 0.424*** 0.554*** 0.133
(state-level) (0.148) (0.170) (0.159)
coalk,1927 -0.172***
(state-level) (0.0606)
Constant -0.326*** -0.421*** -0.0205
(0.0565) (0.0852) (0.0668)
Observations 733 733 733
R-squared 0.019 0.014 0.012
First-stage F -statistic 12.87
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.8: The baseline regressions are robust to controlling for the state-level share of
population in farms.
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Dependent variable:   log (wi,tLi,t/pi,tYi,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form
  log pE,k,t 1.133*** 1.695***
(state-level) (0.289) (0.601)
log-GDP in 1929 -0.0676** -0.0894*** -0.016
(state-level) (0.0256) (0.0318) (0.0275)
coalk,1927 -0.175***
(state-level) (0.0627)
Constant 0.314 0.429** 0.142
(0.191) (0.217) (0.216)
Observations 733 733 733
R-squared 0.018 0.014 0.011
First-stage F -statistic 12.46
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.9: The baseline regressions are robust to controlling for the state-level initial
income.
Table B.10 suggests that the regressions are robust to controlling for a predictor of the
business cycle, such as the county-level growth rate of housing construction from 1920-1924
to 1925-1929 from the 1940 Census of Housing. The Census Bureau asked non-farm dwellers
about the year of construction of their dwelling and aggregated residential construction by
county and quinquennium. This information was digitized by Kimbrough and Snowden
(2007), who kindly provided me with an electronic version of the dataset.
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Dependent variable:   log (wi,tLi,t/pi,tYi,t)
Method: OLS IV reduced-form
  log (pE,k,t/wk,t) 0.890*** 1.847***
(state-level) (0.254) (0.596)
log (H25 29/H20 24) -0.127** -0.191*** -0.0443
(county-level) (0.0530) (0.0725) (0.0550)
coalk,1927 -0.176***
(state-level) (0.0633)
Constant -0.187*** -0.282*** 0.0193
(0.0298) (0.0597) (0.0441)
Observations 730 730 730
R-squared 0.014 0.011
First-stage F -statistic 18.06
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B.10: The baseline results are robust to controlling for the business cycle.
Details: see text. Because the measure of housing is at the county-level, this table reports the F -statistic
from the first-stage of the IV regression, instead of a separate regression at the state-level as in the other
tables of this chapter.
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